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Attempting different approaches to explore the best practice of optimizing mobile 
security and productivity is necessary to improve the Taiwan navy’s maneuverability and 
capability in the information age. This thesis uses a system engineering approach to 
research various mobile security technologies and applications that can provide the 
Taiwan navy with appropriate smartphone systems to develop a secure and productive 
smartphone incorporation plan. Having addressed system requirements, considered 
stakeholders’ concerns, and analyzed commercial off-the-shelf products, preliminary 
results have shown that Apple iOS is the most secure and productive system for 
smartphone incorporation in the Taiwan navy. Before rolling out a comprehensive 
incorporation plan, it is essential to evaluate the recommended technologies through a 
pilot program that simulates realistic naval activities to further correct deficiencies and 
determine the feasibility of the selected technologies. The intent of this research is to 
convince the Taiwan navy that secure smartphone incorporation is achievable through 
leveraging appropriate smartphone technologies and corresponding strategy, policy, and 
training. 
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The Taiwan navy maintains a great emphasis on information integrity, utilized to 
prevent adversaries from compromising information security. However, in doing so 
protection of information prevents users from smoothly operating in a modern network-
centric environment, especially in mobile communications networks, and further impairs 
user productivity. According to various studies and surveys, 61% of information workers 
work outside of the office, 1  and more than 55% percent of respondents say mobile 
devices increase productivity. 2  More importantly, time is money. A 2013 report 
estimated that nine hours a week in productivity gain is equating to US$28 billion saved.3 
Due to its heavily fortified security protocols and disconnection from the World Wide 
Web and smartphone applications, the Taiwan military net lacks updated information and 
convenient functionality. Users rely on the military network only because it contains 
isolated work-related content such as personnel service records, administrative 
documents, executive orders, and logistic supply reports. This has severely undermined 
the Taiwan bc’s productivity and caused it to fall behind other military organizations in 
the information domain.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In response to the steady increase of smartphone usage among the troops, the 
Taiwan Ministry of Defense announced the smartphones management trial phase in 
January 2014.4 Within the trial phase, selected units have the right to operate smartphone 
1 Citrix Systems, Inc., Jump Start Mobile Productivity with MDM and Secure File Sharing, (Fort 
Lauderdale, FL: Citrix), accessed February 11, 2015, https://www.citrix.com/content/dam/citrix/en_us/
documents/oth/jump-start-mobile-productivity-with-mdm-and-secure-file-sharing.pdf. 
2 Ponemon Institute, LLC, Security in the New Mobile Ecosystem (Traverse City, MI: Ponemon 
Institute), August 2014, http://www.wincoil.us/media/89329/ponemon-
raytheonsecurityinthenewmobileecosystemresearchreport.pdf. 
3 Mobile Work Exchange, The 2013 Digital Dilemma Report: Mobility, Security, Productivity—Can 
We Have It All? January 15, 2013, http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/docs/gov/digital_dile_rep.pdf.  





                                                 
devices on military installations, but with certain conditions. To ensure information 
security and military secrecy, each installation establishes “SMART Zones” (Red = 
Restricted, Yellow = Transition, and Green = Go) according to each unit’s infrastructure 
and systems layout.5 In addition to the “Smart Zones” management policy, cellphone 
users have to register their phones with the unit information management authority to 
receive authorization to use the phones. In Taiwan, the military Internet is physically 
separate from the civilian Internet, which means the Taiwan navy intranet does not reply 
on a virtual private network (VPN) or other Internet portals to authenticate intranet users. 
Under current information management guidelines, all USB ports and DVD slots are 
disabled, except those on designated “connector” computers. 
The Taiwan military uses the “containment” approach to handle information 
security concerns. To enter the Taiwan navy intranet via smartphone, the user has to have 
access to military Internet “connector” computers or a Wi-Fi signal. According to the 
described security measures above, the military intranet Wi-Fi signal is a much higher 
risk vulnerability compared to the “connector” computers, which can require up to four 
security checks before gaining access. Although it is easier to access a Wi-Fi signal, it is 
still secure because the signal has been encrypted using a specially designed encryption 
system. Unless the intruder gains access to the “connector” computers or obtains the 
encryption code to decipher the Wi-Fi signal, breaking into the Taiwan navy intranet 
from outside is highly unlikely.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the current Taiwan Naval operational 
environment to construct the optimal smartphone incorporation plan. When the Taiwan 
Minister of Defense starts allowing the troops to bring smartphones onto the base, it 
creates a great opportunity for the Navy to reevaluate the role of its intranet and optimal 
integration of the smartphone into its force structure. Currently, the Navy still thinks of 
smartphone devices as non–work-related personal devices with multiple information 
security vulnerabilities. Although smartphones have proven vulnerable to information 
5 Ibid. 
 2 
                                                 
security threats, the vulnerability assessment should not undermine the potential use and 
benefits that the smartphone technology can bring to the Navy. 
Taiwan is one of the biggest electronics manufacturing countries, and the Taiwan 
navy has strong industrial support related to smartphone technology. Although Taiwan is 
small, it is a population-dense nation with a high demand for cellular technology. 
However, the Taiwan military as a whole is reluctant to incorporate smartphone 
technology due to the security risk posed by China. Currently, most smartphone 
components are built in China, where the communist state is notorious for violating the 
integrity and intellectual property of electronic products. In August 2014, F-Secure, an 
online security and privacy company in Finland, showed that a Xiaomi (Beijing-based 
phone maker) RedMi 1S smartphone sent contact information and phone data back to 
Xiaomi’s remote server. 6  In December 2014, Taiwan’s National Communications 
Commission (NCC) announced that 12 major phone makers, including Xiaomi, were 
under investigation for violation of the Taiwan’s Personal Information Protection Act.7 
Although the investigation later concluded that all tested smartphone models were 
compliant with the terms of the Taiwan’s Personal Information Protection Act, NCC 
noted that there is no defined international standard for smartphone information security 
and it would develop a standard and a device certification program in the future.8 
The Taiwan navy’s biggest challenge is to find the fine balance between 
maximizing information efficiency while minimizing information security risk under the 
complicated and intertwined Cross-Strait relations. This study is to help the Taiwan navy 
to identify and approach this balance by using the system engineering approach.  
6 F-Secure Labs, “Testing the Xiaomi RedMi 1S,” August 7, 2014, https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/
archives/00002731.html. 
7 Eva Dou, “Taiwan Says Phone Makers Violating Privacy Rule,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-says-phone-makers-violating-privacy-rule-1417702686. 
8 Ching-i Wang and Ted Chen, “NCC Clears 12 Smartphone Models in Security Check,” Focus 
Taiwan News Channel, December 30, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ast/201412300025.aspx. 
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C. SCOPE 
This research focuses on potential smartphone system requirements and 
integration. The research looks into existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
smartphones and applications to meet these system requirements, as well as examine 
existing and developing network technologies to meet integration requirements. The 
intent of the research is to provide a realistic and potential solution as to how the Taiwan 
navy should approach incorporating smartphone devices, especially as an asset to 
increase communication survivability and agility. This thesis explores the answers to the 
following questions: 
1. How can the Taiwan navy ensure information security and 
operation security while incorporating smartphones into the 
Taiwan navy maritime force structure? 
2. How can smartphones help to improve the Taiwan navy maritime 
command and control (C2) capabilities and flexibilities? 
3. What are the risks and benefits of smartphone incorporation in 
military organizations? 
Additionally, this research also investigates the following emerging technologies 
as they might apply for the Taiwan navy: 
1. Mobile device security/privacy application 
2. Maritime mobility 
According to the International Telecommunications Union’s estimation, mobile-
cellular penetration will reach 90% in developing countries and 121% in developed 
countries by the end of 2014.9 In addition, according to the Cisco Visual Network Index, 
by 2019, 97% of the global mobile handset traffic will be done via smartphones. 10 
Similar to the impact of the first affordable automobile, the Model T in 1908, 100 years 
9 International Telecommunication Union. The World in 2014—ICT Facts and Figures. (Geneva, 
Switzerland: ICT, April 2014), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/
ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf.  
10 Cisco Systems, Inc., “Cisco Visual Networking Index : Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 
2010—2015,” February 3, 2015, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/
ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.html.  
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later the smartphone has achieved a great impact on human society. The automobile 
allows humans to travel from point A to point B relatively fast and cheaply, while the 
smartphone allows humans to connect information from point A to point B in a relatively 
convenient, timely, and affordable manner. Today in the Information Age, information is 
power and the smartphone has become the hub of information. The organizations that 
manage the smartphone properly thrive, and those that do not wither.  
It is slowly becoming inevitable that every organization, including the military, 
must adopt the smartphone and utilize it as a system in their respective environment. This 
research is designed to examine how a military organization, a closely guarded system, 
can safely and securely adopt the smartphone, an openly connected system, with limited, 
managed risk. Smartphone adoption will not only change the existing security measures 
system but will also modify long-standing human behaviors. The goal of this research is 
to identify the appropriate system requirements for smartphones to enter into a closely 
guarded system and investigate the impact it creates for overall system management.  
This research uses a system engineering approach to identify the requirements, 
draft preliminary designs, and develop an incorporation plan. The end goal of this process 
is to provide the Taiwan navy with a complete and realistic plan for smartphone 
incorporation into its force structure with organizational culture and operational 
environment considerations considered. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter II discusses the current smartphone security measures both in software 
and hardware applications. This chapter also examines current smartphone usage policies 
and guidelines for the U.S. DOD and other countries in order to establish a complete 
understanding of a secure mobile ecosystem. Additionally, the chapter looks into the 
developing satellite and wireless communication technologies that are critical for 
smartphone incorporation in a maritime environment. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to establish technological knowledge about the smartphone security and maritime 
 5 
mobility, as both are critical considerations for the Taiwan navy smartphone 
incorporation process.  
Chapter III uses the system engineering approach to address the primary research 
question. First, it reviews the definition of system engineering to create a general 
understanding of why this approach is in use and why it is critical to the purpose of this 
thesis. Second, using the Vee model of the system engineering approach guideline, this 
chapter describes the concept of operations, identifies the system requirements, and 
creates the needed system design parameters. The concept of operations section addresses 
the organizational and user expectations as well as the definitions of the system-operating 
environment. Next, the system design section looks into existing COTS systems and ideal 
system designs. In addition, Chapter III covers the current technological limitations of 
smartphones and their associated networks.  
Chapter IV outlines the basic framework of a limited objectives experiment, the 
Taiwan navy Smartphone Incorporation Pilot Program, to verify the recommended 
outcomes of the system engineering approach in Chapter III. The pilot program aims to 
reveal the smartphone’s influence on security, productivity, cost, and user experience 
aspects in the Taiwan navy ashore, at sea, and during emergency operations through 
experimental data analysis. The end goal of this chapter is to assist the Taiwan navy to 
make justifiable assessment and determine the feasibility of the smartphone incorporation 
via quantitative measures gathered from the pilot program.  
Chapter V provides the conclusion of this research. The first portion of this 
chapter discusses the practical insight to the future Taiwan navy smartphone 
incorporation plan based on the knowledge and results found through the research 
process. The chapter then revisits the objectives of this research to confirm they were 
properly addressed. Last, this chapter concludes the research by indicating the necessity 
of smartphone adoption while stating the potential future research areas for smartphone 
incorporation into military organizations and environments. 
 6 
II. TECHNOLOGIES REVIEW 
In 2013, Symantec’s Norton report showed the lack of awareness of mobile 
security risks is alarmingly high, with 57% of adults being unaware of a mobile security 
solution. 11  The purpose of mobile security is to protect portable/mobile computing 
devices from threats and vulnerabilities in a wireless network environment. While the 
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) trend continues to grow, so does the associated 
mobile security risk. Research conducted by Checkpoint Software shows that the 
increasing use of mobile devices has increased the number of security incidents, 
especially ones involving privacy and the loss of sensitive data stored in a device.12 This 
lost data includes items such as corporate email, customer data, and network login 
credentials. Therefore, analysis of mobile devices, especially smartphones, which are 
increasingly being embedded in daily life, is critical and urgent to increase the capability 
and awareness of mobile security for both software and hardware.  
A. GOAL OF MOBILE SECURITY (SMARTPHONE) 
Before introducing the various technologies and products associated with 
smartphone security, it is important to understand the goals of smartphone security: 
content protection, theft deterrence, enterprise perspective, and entity authentication.13 
Each goal is interrelated to the others, and together, when appropriately addressed, they 
form a safe and secure environment for smartphone users. Content protection focuses on 
the integrity of the content stored in the devices; it protects contents from malicious 
modification and unauthorized access. Theft deterrence ensures complete device 
accessibility and availability to the authorized user; it allows the user to remotely control 
and lock the lost or stolen smartphone. Enterprise perspective means the full-time 
11 Symantec Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report 2014 (Mountain View, CA: Symantec, April 
2014), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
istr_main_report_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf.  
12 Dimensional Research, The Impact of Mobile Devices on Information Security: A Survey of IT 
Professionals (Sunnyvale, CA: Dimensional Research, June 2013), https://www.checkpoint.com/
downloads/products/check-point-mobile-security-survey-report.pdf.  
13 Qualcomm Inc., “Snapdragon Security,” accessed February 11, 2015, https://www.qualcomm.com/
products/snapdragon/security.  
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protection of sensitive corporate data; it creates corporate networks where both 
employee- and corporate-owned devices can operate safely and securely. Entity 
authentication ensures rightful user identify; it uses various methods like passwords or 
biometrics to protect devices from unauthorized access.  
B. SMARTPHONE SECURITY LAYERS 
In a mobile environment, information rarely remains in place for an extended 
period. It is highly mobile and transferrable across the entire IT infrastructure. Focusing 
solely on the smartphone, the information still constantly moves within the device across 
different layers that pose their own distinct security challenge and risk. To achieve the 
goals in smartphone security, it takes collaboration of a combination of various security 
measures in different device layers shown in Figure 1. Altogether, smartphone security 
has the following layers: server layer, hardware layer, operating system layer, application 
layer, and user layer.14  
 
Figure 1.  Smartphone Security Layers 
14 Neil DuPaul, “Mobile Code Security,” Veracode, accessed February 11, 2015, 
http://www.veracode.com/products/mobile-application-security/mobile-code-security. 
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The server layer may be regarded as the network security layer, which prevents 
malicious applications and attacks from reaching the targeted smartphones; it is the 
outermost layer in layered smartphone security architecture. The hardware layer deploys 
security measures at device component and firmware level such as Roots of Trust (RoTs), 
trusted execution environment, and secure subscriber identity module (SIM) 
authentication where malicious manipulations are unlikely. The operating system (OS) 
layer connects the hardware and application layers where the regular OS update is the 
main defensive mechanism to ensure safe and secure connection between the hardware 
and application layers. The application layer is where most mobile security incidents take 
place; similar to human skin where bacteria resides and breaks through into our immune 
system, the malicious software does the same at the application layer. The common 
security approaches at this layer are the applications review and mobile security/antivirus 
products. Last, the user layer, which takes the context out of computer science and into 
the realm of social science, implements mobile security through education and training. 
Currently, the Taiwan navy intranet is a closed network with no authorized wired 
(tethered) or wireless smartphone connections. Therefore, the smartphone security 
concerns to the Taiwan navy intranet resource do not exist in the server layer. The 
Taiwan navy surface combatants do not regularly conduct long distance and long-term 
deployments, which means most of the ships spend equal amounts of time in port and at 
sea. The key difference between these two operating conditions is the availability of a 
cellular signal, which potentially connects the military domain to the public domain.  
C. SMARTPHONE SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
The foundation of a safe and secure smartphone system is a combination of both 
software- and hardware-based security solutions that can reach the goals of mobile 
security through the different mobile security layers. Although the software- and 
hardware-based solutions have the same smartphone security goals to achieve, both 
solutions are inherently different in many ways such as design consideration, 
interoperability, and performance.  
 9 
1. Software-Based Smartphone Security (Third Party) 
Considering most smartphone users are not involved in smartphone design and 
development process, we don’t include the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
security solutions as part of software-based (third-party) security solutions which are 
more accessible and well known to the users. Several reports state that the software-based 
smartphone security market is set to grow to 3.4 billion by 2018, compared to 2.3 billion 
of the hardware-based market. 15  The increasingly popular BYOD trend in major 
organizations and the convenience of developing software are the core reasons that 
software-based solutions dominate hardware-based solutions in the global mobile 
security market.  
Looking into the current smartphone security software, we identify three common 
practices: remote control, application-level security, and antivirus/firewall. These three 
practices rely on either preinstalled or third-party applications to perform security-related 
actions.  
a. Remote Control 
This function is possible because of the cloud or so-called web-based 
technologies. The basic flow to enable the remote functions in the smartphone is to 
download the application and login onto its web-based management center. Upon login, 
the application starts transmitting device data to the server, which allows the user to 
remotely control the device through an Internet portal. Remote security functions have 
thrived due to the emerging cloud-computing trend in recent years, which mainly 
addresses the lost and stolen device issue. According to Consumer Reports, in 2013 more 
15 David M. Wheeler, “Smartphone Security—A Holistic View of Layered Defenses,” SecureComm, 
Inc., accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.securecommconsulting.com/downloads/
NPS_Presentation_on_Smartphone_Security.pdf; Infonetics Research, “Infonetics Projects Mobile Device 
Security Software Market to Reach $3.4 Billion in 2018,” April 25, 2014, http://www.infonetics.com/pr/
2014/2H13-Mobile-Security-Client-Software-Market-Highlights.asp.; Brian Robinson, “Hardware-Based 
Mobile Security Market Heats up,” Government Computer News, February 10, 2014, http://gcn.com/
articles/2014/02/10/mobile-hardware-security.aspx?admgarea=TC_Mobile. 
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than three million smartphones had been lost or stolen in the United States.16 The remote 
control functionality allows the owners or organizations to track, lock, wipe, backup, and 
kill the lost or stolen device to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information. 
However, the remote control works only when the device connects to the Internet, which 
leaves open the possibility for the thief to block the remote control function by simply 
staying offline, thereby retaining an opportunity to break into the device.  
b. Application-Level Security 
At Apple’s Worldwide Developer’s Conference in San Francisco, June 2014, 
CEO Tim Cook announced many impressive business facts and numbers. Among them 
were that there are 1.2 million applications (apps) available on the iTunes App Store and 
75 billion application-downloads. Presently, consumers rely heavily on the applications 
installed on their devices to aid in activities ranging from entertainment such as games, 
videos, and music to professional services such as banking, financial analysis, and health 
monitoring. There are currently 23 different application categories listed in the Apple 
App Store. 17  The complicated relationship between user behaviors and business 
opportunities in the smartphone market has created a gap where malicious acts can be 
carried out. Not until the recent information security breaches such as Edward Snowden, 
Target, and Heartbleed, did smartphone users start realizing the significance of 
information security.  
The application-level security generalizes many security-related functions that 
smartphone applications can do. More specifically, the application-level security 
functions include data encryption/protection, authentication, application 
disablement/containment, VPN, and geo-fencing.18 These functions all have their own 
unique role in defending smartphones against malicious attacks. For example, the 
disablement function can disable location tracking-related applications when users 
16 Donna Tapellini, “Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million Last Year, Consumer Reports Finds,” 
Consumer Reports, May 28, 2014, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-
rose-to-3-1-million-last-year/index.htm. 
17 Apple Inc., “App Store Downloads on iTunes,” accessed February 11, 2015, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/genre/ios/id36?mt=8. 
18 Wheeler, “Smartphone Security.” 
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conduct sensitive operations or disable smartphone sensors when users enter restricted 
areas. The geo-fencing feature can allow implementation of needed security settings 
based on the location of the smartphones. It is important to note that application-level 
security is critical during the application design and development phases. Every 
shortcoming in addressing all facets of application-level security concerns will result in 
potential product vulnerabilities and exploitation for an attacker.  
In addition, application-level security can also be part of the emerging Mobile 
Application Management (MAM) capability, which gives the device owners or the 
administrators the ability to enforce application security policy and perform application 
classification. 19  There are two main MAM strategies: app containerization and app 
wrapping. Containerization is a term to describe the separation or division between the 
corporate and personal applications and data on the smartphone. 20  Wrapping means 
applying an additional management layer to an applications or a group of applications.21 
The app containerization demands intense coding and often results in negative impact on 
device performance and user experience by requiring users to switch in and out of 
“containers” between work and personal use.22 In contrast, the app wrapping requires no 
coding and its perceived simplicity has helped its popularity to exceed that of the 
containerization approach. In 2013, ABI Research predicted the application wrapping 
adoption would grow at a 27% rate through 2018, whereas containerization will grow at a 
23% rate in the mobile workspace management market.23  
19 Margaret Rouse, “Mobile Application Management (MAM),” TechTarget, June 2014, 
http://searchconsumerization.techtarget.com/definition/mobile-application-management. 
20 Ken Lienemann, “Containerization: Balancing BYOD for the Enterprise and You,” Wired, June 24, 
2014, http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/containerization-balancing-byod-for-the-enterprise-and-
you#axzz3RTOachqw. 
21 Margaret Rouse, “App Wrapping (Application Wrapping),” TechTarget, July 2012, 
http://searchconsumerization.techtarget.com/definition/app-wrapping-application-wrapping. 
22 Declan McNamara, “Balancing Corporate Security with User Experience,” IBM, April 5, 2013, 
http://asmarterplanet.com/mobile-enterprise/blog/2013/04/balance-corporate-security.html; Stephen 
Skidmore, “App Wrapping Is a Form of Containerization,” Apperian, April 16, 2014, 
http://www.apperian.com/app-wrapping-is-a-form-of-containerization/. 
23 ABI Research, “App Wrapping and Container Technologies to Drive Mobile Workspace 
Management Subscribers Past 60 Million by 2018,” September 16, 2013, https://www.abiresearch.com/
press/app-wrapping-and-container-technologies-to-drive-m/. 
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c. Antivirus/Firewall 
Unlike the Apple iOS applications, which undergo extensive reviews before 
release to the public, many Android applications are insufficient in mobile security risk 
mitigations. Worst of all, there are malicious applications made available to the public, 
prompting the development of smartphone antivirus/firewall applications. What makes 
the mobile antivirus applications different from other mobile security applications is the 
performance requirements. Smartphone users expect mobile antivirus applications to be 
always-on, compared to the other security functions that only need to perform when 
specific actions require it.  
Typically, the antivirus, antispam, virus scan, and firewall applications in personal 
computers and smartphones have the same objectives. However, due to the fundamental 
differences between personal computers and smartphone design in terms of power source, 
computing power, and operational system structure, the mobile antivirus application does 
not behave in the same way as it does in personal computers. For example, an antivirus 
application in the Apple iOS environment cannot automatically access and scan contents 
existing in the iOS or other applications due to the iPhone’s “sandbox” practice, which is 
where applications are separated from the iOS and other applications by default. This 
means that if you want to scan an email attachment, you will need to manually send the 
attachment to the antivirus application first before conducting the virus scan. 24 
Furthermore, the antivirus is just another application that rests above the smartphone OS 
instead of within it. To clarify, if the phone itself was “jailbroken,” or “rooted,” a form of 
device privilege control and escalation, the antivirus application is now vulnerable to the 
malware embedded in the OS instead of being able to protect the OS against it.25 
24 Eric Beehler, “How Mobile Antivirus Software Works and How to Know If You Need It,” 
TechTarget, March 2014, http://searchconsumerization.techtarget.com/opinion/How-mobile-antivirus-
software-works-and-how-to-know-if-you-need-it. 
25 Serge Malenkovich, “Rooting and Jailbreaking: What Can They Do, and How Do They Affect 
Security?,” Kaspersky Lab (blog), May 31, 2013, http://blog.kaspersky.com/rooting-and-jailbreaking/. 
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2. Hardware-Based Smartphone Security (OEM) 
In 2012, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the 
Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices (Draft), which pointed out: 
“Mobile devices are vulnerable to ‘jailbreaking’ and ‘rooting,’ which provided device 
owners with greater flexibility and control over the devices, but also bypasses important 
security features which may introduce new vulnerabilities.” 26  Although common 
smartphone security solutions are software-based, some of these solutions have been 
proven inadequate and inefficient for meeting the higher security requirement demanded 
by government agencies and military units. 27  According to NIST’s findings and 
guidelines, many mobile devices are not capable of providing strong security assurance 
because they lack hardware-based security solutions. The software-based solutions’ 
easily mutable and manipulate-able nature is the cause of recent increases in hardware-
based smartphone security investments and developments.28  
The significance of the hardware-based solution is its immutability and reliability 
compared to its software-based counterpart.29 Instead of protecting the smartphones at 
the outer layers (user and application), the hardware-based solution now provides 
protection to the inside layers (server, hardware, and OS). From various resources 
including the NIST’s guidelines on mobile security, the National Security Agency’s High 
Assurance Platform (HAP) initiative, and Trusted Computing Group’s research and 
development, one can identify four trending hardware-based mobile security 
technologies: hypervisor (virtualization), Trusted Platform Module (Roots of 
Trust/RoTs), secure operating system, and secure SIM. 
26 Lily Chen, Joshua Franklin, and Andrew Regenscheid, Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in 
Mobile Devices (Draft) (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 
2012), 1, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-164/sp800_164_draft.pdf. 
27 Wheeler, “Smartphone Security”; Robinson, “Hardware-Based Mobile Security Market Heats Up.” 
28 Robinson, “Hardware-Based Mobile Security Market Heats Up.” 
29 Chen, Franklin, and Regenscheid, Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices 
(Draft) (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 2012), 1. 
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a. Hypervisor (Virtualization) 
A hypervisor is a manger or monitor for all running virtual machines (VMs) on a 
host computer system.30 There are Type I bare-metal hypervisors and Type II hosted 
hypervisors. The fundamental difference between the two types is where the hypervisor is 
located in the computer architectures. Type II resides on top of the device OS such as 
Mac OS, Windows 8, and Linux, while Type I resides below the device OS. 31 
Implementing a Type I hypervisor in smartphones requires more extensive hardware 
support, which imposes higher costs and requires more time for the smartphone 
manufacturers to develop new smartphone products. In contrast, although it is easier to 
install a Type II hypervisor on to devices, it is still difficult to do because the modern 
smartphone OS is either tightly controlled (Apple iOS) or heavily customized 
(Android).32  
Strictly speaking, a hypervisor is considered a piece of software. However, since 
it is one of the OEM smartphone security solutions, we addressed this solution under the 
hardware-based smartphone security section. To most computer users, virtualization is 
just a way to run multiple operational systems on a single computer system. However, to 
government and business organizations, virtualization means more than just doing more 
with less—it is better security management and lower security risk. Part of the design 
requirements for a hypervisor is to mediate VM access to the host device’s physical 
resources, provide isolation among VMs, and enable secure connections among VMs and 
to the external network.33 
30 Margaret Rouse, “Hypervisor,” TechTarget, October 2006, 
http://searchservervirtualization.techtarget.com/definition/hypervisor. 
31 Bill Kleyman, “Hypervisor 101: Understanding the Virtualization Market,” Data Center Knowledge, 
August 1, 2012, http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2012/08/01/hypervisor-101-a-look-
hypervisor-market/. 
32 Kurt Marko, “3 Ways To Virtualize Mobile Devices—And Why You Should Do So,” 
InformationWeek, July 2, 2013, http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/3-ways-to-virtualize-
mobile-devices----and-why-you-should-do-so/d/d-id/1110613?. 
33 Ramaswamy Chandramouli, Security Recommendations for Hypervisor Deployment (Gaithersburg, 
MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
drafts/800-125a/sp800-125a_draft.pdf. 
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When the iPhone was first introduced in 2007, few could visualize the mobile 
virtualization on its 32-bit/412 MHz CPU and 128 MB RAM simply because of its 
limited computing power.34 The recently released iPhone 6 features a 64-bit/1.4 GHz 
dual-core CPU and 1 GB RAM, which is potentially more powerful than some of the PCs 
on the market.35  The recent increase in computing power in smartphones has made 
mobile virtualization possible, for a smartphone hypervisor allows a single device to have 
multiple virtual phones (VPs) that account for the dynamic mobile environment and 
separation of work and personal data. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Trusted Handheld 
Platform effort is an example of achieving high-level security assurance and minimizing 
attack surfaces by operating an independently customized and trusted secure OS on a 
smartphone hypervisor.36   
In addition, the virtualization has extended deeper into the hardware level, for the 
new type of hypervisor (Type 0) has already been developed and implemented. Figure 2 
shows how different types of hypervisors reside with respect to the host hardware and OS 
and lists the average size of each type. The Type 0 hypervisor is the smallest in size and 
closest to the hardware component, which provides hackers a minimum attack surface 
and users a more stable and secure virtual operating environment.37  
34 EveryiPhone.com, “Apple iPhone (Original/1st Gen/EDGE) 4, 8, 16 GB Specs,” accessed February 
11, 2015, http://www.everymac.com/systems/apple/iphone/specs/apple-iphone-specs.html. 
35 EveryiPhone.com, “Apple iPhone 6 (GSM/North America/A1549) 16, 64, 128 GB Specs,” accessed 
February 11, 2015, http://www.everymac.com/systems/apple/iphone/specs/apple-iphone-6-a1549-4.7-inch-
gsm-north-america-specs.html. 
36 John McHale, “For Every Soldier, a Smartphone,” Military Embedded Systems, October 9, 2013, 
http://mil-embedded.com/articles/for-every-soldier-smartphone/. 
37 Lynx Software Technologies, Inc., “The Rise of the Type Zero Hypervisor,” accessed February 11, 
2015, http://www.lynx.com/whitepaper/the-rise-of-the-type-zero-hypervisor/. 
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Figure 2.  Hypervisor Size Chart38 
With support of the embedded architecture in the processor, the Type 0 
hypervisor is able to perform memory and resource separation to create separate virtual 
environments.39 The ability to perform physical separation is significant since it allows 
for complete domain isolation and application containerization, which are both critical in 
countering virtualization escape attacks. For example, the NSA’s HAP uses Intel’s 
hardware virtualization technology to protect execution space and memory to prevent 
resources in one domain from unauthorized access by hardware and software from 
another domain.40 
The capability to form separate virtual smartphone domains and seamlessly 
switch from one virtual smartphone to another exists. Yet, there are several problems in 
adapting this practice, which ties deeply with users’ habits and the blurred lines between 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 National Security Agency, “NSA’s First Trusted Computing Conference and Exposition,” accessed 
February 12, 2015, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/media_center/ia/video/orlando2010/transcript.html; 
“HIGH ASSURANCE PLATFORM® (HAP),” National Security Agency, accessed February 11, 2015, 
https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/hap_ds.pdf. 
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work and personal spaces. As Tal Klein, former Director of Technical Marketing for 
Citrix, pointed out: 
In the dual persona use case, IT is forcing end-users who don’t have 
multiple personalities to adopt multiple personalities. This is not holistic 
and forces people to work in a different context because IT says so with no 
added benefit to the end-user. It is contrary to how we interact with our 
computing devices, especially phones and thus destined to fail.41 
Allegorically, safety goggles cannot protect people’s eyes if no one likes to wear them. In 
this case, the same applies to virtual safe smartphones: the organization cannot ensure 
smartphone security if no one likes to use the security measures due to cumbersomeness 
or performance degradation.  
b. Trusted Platform Module (Roots of Trust, RoTs) 
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a trusted computing technology 
developed and implemented by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), a global industry 
standards group that includes members such as Intel, Microsoft, IBM, Dell, and Hewlett-
Packard. TPM is a separate hardware component that integrates various computing 
devices including smartphones. First introduced in 2003, TPM drove the creation of the 
entire trusted computing ecosystem.42 In light of the mobile computing expansion and the 
BYOD trend, the computer industry is eager to expand the trusted computing envelope 
over the smartphone domain.  
The TPM, a small computer (microcontroller), is comprised of a secure 
cryptoprocessor, a protected memory, and a programmable input/output peripheral. It 
performs hardware encryption and safe information storage to create the “Trust 
41 Gunnar Berger, “Gartner Catalyst 2012: Is the Mobile Hypervisor the Right BYOD Approach?,” 
Gartner Inc. (blog), August 7, 2012, http://blogs.gartner.com/gunnar-berger/gartner-catalyst-2012-is-the-
mobile-hypervisor-the-right-byod-approach/. 
42 Trusted Computing Group, “Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary,” accessed February 11, 
2015, http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/trusted_platform_module_tpm_summary; Mike 
Boyle, “Trusted Computing Standards Overview,” National Security Agency, October 4, 2012, 
http://scap.nist.gov/events/2012/itsac/presentations/day2/4Oct_1145am_Boyle.pdf.  
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Boundary.”43 The environment enclosed within the trust boundary has led to the creation 
of the Roots of Trust (RoTs) concept. In NIST’s Guidelines on Hardware-rooted Security 
in Mobile Devices (Draft), the RoTs are defined as “security primitives composed of 
hardware, firmware, and/or software that provide a set of trusted, security-critical 
functions.”44 The RoTs are particularly instrumental to attestation. 
Attestation (hardware authentication) is a mechanism for device integrity 
validation. It compares the device integrity measurements collected at different times to 
verify integrity or detect modification of the device. 45  Using the result from the 
attestation, the device can block unauthorized modifications or maliciously installed 
codes from executing until proper remediate actions or reinstatements are performed.46 
The attestation is done locally within the device or remotely on a network server to 
manage access control. This deep-level security function involves the following roots of 
trust: 
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): The RTM measures the device’s 
integrity. The integrity measurement usually is an encrypted software 
image file or device configuration file. 
• Root of Trust for Integrity (RTI): The RTI provides protected location 
where stores the integrity-sensitive data such as boot time measurement. 
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR): The RTR performs identity and 
signature services on the integrity measurement data during the attestation 
process. 
• Root of Trust for Confidentiality (RTC): The RTC provides protected 
location for storing confidential data such as encryption keys. Although 
both RTI and RTC try to protect the stored data, the most significant 
difference between the two is that RTI data can be shared but RTC data 
43 Thomas Hardjono and Greg Kazmierczak, Overview of the TPM Key Management Standard 
(Beaverton, OR: Trusted Computing Group), accessed February 11, 2015, 
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/ABEDDF95-1D09-3519-
AD65431FC12992B4/Kazmierczak20Greg20-20TPM_Key_Management_KMS2008_v003.pdf. 
44 Chen, Franklin, and Regenscheid, Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices 
(Draft) (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 2012), 1. 
45 Kathleen N. McGill, “Trusted Mobile Devices: Requirements for a Mobile Trusted Platform 
Module,” Johns Hopkins APL (Applied Physics Laboratory) Technical Digest 32, no. 2 (2013): 545. 
46 National Security Agency, “NSA’s First Trusted Computing Conference and Exposition.” 
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cannot. Therefore, RTI and RTC require different access control 
interfaces. 
• Root of Trust for Verification (RTV): The RTV verifies the integrity of 
the device and its software and date. This can be achieved by comparing 
the stored integrity measurements or matching the encryption keys. 
Figure 3 shows typical RoTs interactions in the trusted computing attestation 
mechanism. First, the RTM requests the integrity measurements of the latest platform 
configurations and stores the information in the RTI. It is important to understand that the 
RTM does not actively perform the integrity measurement, but rather the host software 
conducts the measurements and sends them to the RTM.47 Usually, the measurement 
process occurs during the boot cycle where RTM is provided with the most genuine 
information. During an attestation, a trusted computing application asks the RTR to 
deliver a signed integrity measurement report. The RTR then retrieves the integrity 
measurements stored in the RTI, signs the data with RTC encryption keys, and reports the 
data back to the trusted computing application for the attestation.48 
 
 
Figure 3.  Root of Trust Interactions for an Attestation49 
47 Raymond Ng, “Trusted Platform Module TPM Fundamental,” Infineon Technologies, August 2008, 
http://www.cs.unh.edu/~it666/reading_list/Hardware/tpm_fundamentals.pdf. 
48 McGill, “Trusted Mobile Devices,” 547. 
49 Ibid.  
 20 
                                                 
The significance of the TPM and RoT concept is to create a trusted flow (Measure, 
Verify, and Execute) in smartphones to ensure not only device integrity but also network 
integrity.50 The establishment of the trusted flow within different smartphone security 
layers is the anchor of the overall security of the smartphone ecosystem. However, the 
TPM still has its own vulnerabilities to malicious attacks such as using physical objects to 
reset and bypass TPM chip security features, exploiting dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM) trace effects that allow the retrieval of contents stored in the DRAM without 
initiating TPM attestation process, and social engineering. One way to mitigate the TPM 
security risk is to eliminate unauthorized physical access to the TPM chip.51 
c. Secure Operating System 
The importance of a well-designed and well-written secure operating system 
cannot be overstated. The operating system is where both software- and hardware-based 
solutions interact like a medicine and an organ do within our immune system. A secure 
operating system can dramatically reduce the dependence of the third-party security 
solutions and the overhead cost of the hardware security development. Based on a report 
dated April 2014 from Gamma Group, one of the most prominent surveillance companies 
in the world, the iPhone is still the most secure smartphone. It is critical to understand 
that a secure operating system does not guarantee a secure smartphone. The secure 
operating system is only part of smartphone security chain, a collaboration of secure 
software, hardware, and service.52  
In the case of Apple iOS, one of its secure features is “sandboxing,” which is a 
term to describe the mobile security approach of limiting or isolating the environments in 
50 Ibid.  
51 Philip Roman et al., “Trusted Platform Module,” ResearchedSolution (blog), November 25, 2012, 
https://researchedsolution.wordpress.com/2013/09/14/trusted-platform-module/. 
52 Craig Timberg, “Why Surveillance Companies Hate the iPhone,” Washington Post, August 11, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/11/why-surveillance-companies-hate-
the-iphone/; Apple Inc., iOS Security, October 2014, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/
iOS_Security_Guide.pdf. 
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which only certain code can execute to prevent unauthorized interactions.53 In the iOS 
security architecture, the encrypted file system has already been partitioned into its user 
and OS parts. This initial separation shields the system file and resources from users and 
all third-party applications. Furthermore, within the user partition, each third-party 
application is sandboxed. The default sandboxing is to restrict all third-party applications 
from accessing data stored in other applications or from modifying the device. The 
sandboxing practice, along with the application review process, has dramatically reduced 
the chance of malicious intrusion and infection in the iOS. To improve the end-user 
experience, Apple has developed its own mobile device management (MDM) feature into 
the latest iOS version 8.54 However, the jailbreaking process can strip away the security 
and MDM features and leave the smartphone vulnerable to third-party malicious 
applications. 
d. Secure SIM 
At the 2013 Black Hat security conference, Karsten Nohl, a security researcher 
with Security Research Labs, demonstrated the ability to exploit mobile SIM’s outdated 
encryption standard and grant access to the device’s SMS (Short Message Service), 
location information, and voicemail numbers. With nearly seven billion SIM card users 
globally, the SIM is considered the most common mobile security token in the world.55 
Therefore, any SIM vulnerability is a gateway to large-scale mobile security breaches, let 
alone the potential to impact the trend toward mobile device–based payment transactions. 
The SIM is a device identification and authentication specification formalized to 
appropriately manage user/network authorization. Similar to TPM, the SIM is also a 
small computer and acts as a trusted bridge between devices and network providers. 
There are total of 14 different types of information stored in the SIM, and they all serve 
53 “About App Sandbox,” Apple Inc., accessed February 12, 2015, https://developer.apple.com/library/
mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/
AboutAppSandbox.html. 
54 Apple Inc., iOS Security. 
55 Security Research Labs, “Rooting SIM Cards,” July 31, 2013, https://srlabs.de/rooting-sim-cards/. 
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different purposes in various applications related to mobile service.56 It is important to 
understand that the SIM is a separate entity from smartphones and is highly accessible 
and transferable. Therefore, to implement SIM security is as difficult and complicated as 
it is in smartphone device security. However, for the purpose of this study, we consider 
SIM security as part of smartphone security and focus on the SIM security applications in 
smartphone usage. 
In a typical case of SIM card authentication, when a subscriber wants to make a 
phone call, the mobile station (MS) establishes a connection with the network base 
station (BS) and then relays the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) from the 
SIM to the BS, or more accurately, a temporary value representing the IMSI. After the 
BS recognizes the registered IMSI, it will send a random number (RAND) back to the 
SIM via the MS. After receiving the RAND, the SIM processes it with its encryption key 
and produces an output called a signed response (SRES). The SRES, an encrypted text, is 
then transmitted back to the BS via the MS and is verified by the network to determine 
the authenticity and identity of the user device and to authorize the user to place a call. As 
the cellular network and smartphone technologies continue to evolve, the SIM is no 
longer just a simple security token for placing a phone call. It can also be the security 
token for the WLAN (Wireless Local Area network), NFC (Near Field Communication), 
and RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) services. 
Although the detailed SIM card–based security protocols vary in the cellular 
network, WLAN, and NFC services, the SIM card plays the same role as a security 
element in the overall mobile security scheme. Being a secure element means the 
guarantee of the integrity of stored contents. There are various ways to increase SIM 
security, such as better encryption mechanisms and device- or network-based SMS 
antivirus/firewall. Users must realize the fact that mobile data safety is directly tied to 
56 eBay, “SIM Card Guide,” June 9, 2014, http://www.ebay.com/gds/SIM-Card-Guide-
/10000000177629426/g.html. 
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SIM safety. 57  The potential risks derived from the secure SIM may not be fully 
quantifiable, for the security applications in both public and military mobile services, 
such as transport, access control (passport), bank/finance, and mobile money, can all 
greatly benefit from secure SIMs.  
No networked system, including the smartphone, is completely or totally secure. 
There is no silver bullet for securing a smartphone successfully—this requires the 
collaboration and combination of various security technologies and applications. After 
understanding how to secure smartphones in a technical context, it is time to examine the 
policy context where the technology and user connect to realize the goals of smartphone 
security.  
D. MOBILE DEVICE INCORPORATION 
A comprehensive process is the cornerstone to a successful mobile device 
incorporation program, which creates an environment optimized for information sharing 
between employer and employee.58 The proliferation of smartphones has dramatically 
changed the traditional boundaries between personal environs and workspaces, and in 
doing so has created pressing needs for mobile device management. Many organizations 
face the pressures and challenges to obtain the right balance between productivity and 
security. Recognizing the inevitable smartphone implementation and social penetration, 
numerous well-known organizations such as the U.S. Department of Defense, IBM, and 
BlackBerry Ltd., have issued publications regarding mobile device strategy, 
implementation, and usage. Surveying these key documents led to the identification of 
the essential ingredients for a successful mobile device incorporation process. 
57 Sridher (Sree) Swaminathan, Mobile/NFC Security Fundamentals: Secure Elements 101 (Princeton 
Junction, NJ: Smart Card Alliance, March 28, 2013), http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/webinars/
Secure_Elements_101_FINAL3_032813.pdf; Security Research Labs, “Rooting SIM Cards”; Alex 
Savitsky, “Weak Link: How (Not) To Lose Everything Having Lost Your SIM-Card,” Kaspersky Lab 
(blog), November 17, 2014, http://blog.kaspersky.com/make-your-sim-secure/.  
58 Apple Inc., “iPad in Business—Bring Your Own Device,” accessed February 12, 2015, 
https://www.apple.com/ipad/business/it/byod.html. 
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Figure 4 shows the process of becoming a mobile organization involves four parts 
in a closed loop: strategy, policy, technology, and education.59 
 
 
Figure 4.  Mobile Device Incorporation Process60 
Each part has its own unique purpose in the organization mobilization process, yet all are 
interconnected to form a continuous cycle able to adapt to the ever-evolving mobile 
computing technologies. Interestingly enough, the process itself shares similarities with 
the system engineering process.  
1. Strategy 
All plans should start with a sound strategy. The strategy is the core of the 
incorporation plan. It gives organizations the reasons why they do what they do. A good 
strategy acts like a cohesive agent that unites employer and employees as a whole and 
creates a uniform ideology across the entire organization. For example, the opening line 
of the U.S. DOD Mobile Device Strategy is its Mobility Vision statement: 
A highly mobile workforce equipped with secure access to information 
and computing power anywhere at anytime for greater mission 
effectiveness.61 




                                                 
At IBM, the former chief information officer (CIO), Jeanette Horan, also gave the 
entire organization a concise goal statement for the IBM BYOD program: 
[It] really is about supporting employees in the way they want to work. 
They will find the most appropriate tool to get their job done. I want to 
make sure I can enable them to do that, but in a way that safeguards the 
integrity of our business.62  
The statement sets the keel of the incorporation plan by defining the plan to serve as the 
fundamental guideline for future policy, technology, and education parts. In the strategy 
section, certain critical information should be identify and defined. Without properly 
identifying and defining the key information the mobile device incorporation plan is 
destined to fail, resulting in catastrophic security breaches. Table 1 lists the key 
information and considerations for planners during the initial strategy part in developing 
the incorporation plan.  
Table 1.   Key Strategy Information63 
 Key Information Considerations  
1 Vision 
What mobile means for your organization 
Why mobile is important to your organization 
Where your organization will be five years from now 
2 Goal What mobile advantages your organization wants to obtain What mobile risks your organization wants to avoid 
3 Organization Character 
What type of organization is yours 
What your organizational culture is like 
4 User Behavior 
What mobile means for your employees 
Why mobile is important to your employees 
How mobile your employees are now 
 
61 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Mobile Device Strategy (Version 2.0) 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, May 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/
dodmobilitystrategy.pdf.  
62 Pepin, “BYOD at IBM.” 
63 SAP SE, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Policy Guidebook: Questions to Ask and Best Practices to 
Consider, accessed February 12, 2015, http://www.emedialaw.com/files/2013/02/SAP-BYOD-Policy-
Guidebook2.pdf; Richard Absalom, Beyond BYOD : How Businesses Might COPE with Mobility (London: 
Ovum Ltd.), accessed February 12, 2015, http://us.blackberry.com/content/dam/blackBerry/pdf/business/
english/Beyond-BYOD-BlackBerry-Ovum.pdf.  
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In addition to creating a concise strategy statement, the organization needs to 
choose the most suitable strategic option for its mobile device incorporation. These 
options are: 1) BYOD—Bring Your Own Device, 2) COPE—Corporate Owned 
Personally Enabled, 3) CYOD—Choose Your Own Device, and 4) COBO—Corporate 
Owned Business Only. Each option has specific benefits and drawbacks, and will suit 
certain scenarios, and organizations, better than others will, as depicted in Table 2.64  
Table 2.   Strategic Options65 
































Lowest security risk 
Low cost 







*Be aware of false economy. Studies have shown that the same activities can cost up to 
five times more on a personal plan than on a business plan due to subsidizing and 
reimbursing.66  
**Organizations often use CYOD alongside COPE option.67  
 
2. Policy 
After creating a strategy statement and selecting the strategic option, the 
organization must establish a policy that enables the vision and goals within this strategy. 





                                                 
The policy section, the most complex portion of the entire plan, contains key 
information-related considerations in need of evaluation, such as the incorporation model, 
device model, management solution, and security standard and baselines.68 It is essential 
for the planners to establish a comprehensive but also well-orchestrated policy because 
this is the hub that grants the mobile device strategy the ability to successfully and 
smoothly permeate every level and corner of the organization. Constructing a sound 
policy is time-consuming and complicated, but it is required. The policy itself is the 
collaboration of multiple departments such as information technology, security, 
acquisition, human resources, finance, and legal.69 Each department has unique demands 
and special concerns for mobile device incorporation.  
Most importantly, the policy directly influences the employee’s cognitive 
reactions and behaviors. The employee’s negative cognitive feelings are the biggest 
resistance to a successful mobile organization. A research commissioned by Raytheon 
revealed that 56% of survey respondents said that employee resistance is the biggest 
barrier to an effective mobile strategy. 70  Thus, planners must always consider user 
experience during the policy-drafting section. Table 3 provides the planners with the key 




68 Absalom, Beyond BYOD; Murugiah Souppaya and Karen Scarfone, Guidelines for Managing and 
Securing Mobile Devices in the Enterprise Revision 1 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, June 2013), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-124r1.pdf; 
United States Department of Defense, DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, February 15, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/
news/dodcMdimplementationplan.pdf.  
69 Pepin, “BYOD at IBM”; SAP SE, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Policy Guidebook. 
70 Ponemon Institute, LLC., Security in the New Mobile Ecosystem. 
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Table 3.   Key Policy Guidance71 
 Department Guidance 
1 Information Technology 
Establish secure corporate mobile infrastructures (networks access 
control, secure VPN, and antivirus/firewall) 
Establish MDM/MAM governance structure (include device 
loss/stolen response actions) 
Establish mobile device security updates/support/scan/monitor 
procedure 
2 Security 
Establish mobile device security certification process and security 
baseline 
Establish mobile device usage security protocols and regulations 
Establish data classification protocols and regulations 
3 Acquisition 
Establish a list of approved mobile devices 
Establish mobile device logistics and support procedure with 
vendors 
Establish fair contract between mobile network providers, mobile 
device vendors, and organization 
4 Human Resources 
Establish mobile device security training program (including 
incoming and exiting employees) 
Establish mobile device user classification protocols and regulations  
Establish mobile device security violation protocols and regulations 
5 Finance Establish mobile device usage charges and refund conditions Establish budget for mobile device incorporation plan  
6 Legal 
Establish mobile device terms and conditions that comply with 
regional privacy and data protection laws and regulations. 
Establish mobile device user agreements and consent with 
organization 
3. Technology 
Without the appropriate technological support structure, the policy cannot be 
successfully implemented. Based on the chosen strategic option and first policy iteration, 
organizations need to identify suitable technologies to be implemented in the 
incorporation plan. Most of the popular technologies identified earlier in the smartphone 
security section will be implemented throughout multiple mobile device security aspects 
such as mobile device management (MDM), mobile application management (MAM), 
and network access control (NAC). 
71 SAP SE, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Policy Guidebook; Absalom, Beyond BYOD; United 
States Department of Defense, “DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan”; Souppaya and 
Scarfone, Guidelines for Managing and Securing Mobile Devices. 
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Often times the policy and the current technological support do not match up, 
which creates increased opportunities for security breaches and potential for high 
consequential damages. The objectives of a pilot program are to examine the policy for 
completeness, identify defects, obtain user feedback, and make further corrections and 
improvements.72  The importance of the pilot program cannot be understated, for prior to 
official rollout of the mobile device incorporation plan, the organization must form the 
least risky pilot group comprised of employees from various departments and levels to 
test the policy.73 
4. Training 
The artifacts of the first three sections in the mobile device incorporation process, 
strategy (Brain), policy (Nerve), and technology (Muscle), lead to the development of the 
final section, training (Practice). Training is a process to familiarize and master a 
particular skill or type of behavior through constant practice and improvement. The 
purposes of mobile device incorporation training is to help an organization’s members 
understand mobile threats and vulnerabilities, to establish trusted mobile device user 
behaviors, to build a culture of security, and ultimately create a secure mobile 
enterprise.74  
Mobile device incorporation planners need to be aware that the mobile device 
incorporation process is dynamic and continuous in nature. All parts in the process are 
interactive, interdependent, and interrelated. As a chain is only as good as the weakest 
link, a plan is only as good as the weakest part. Insufficient understanding of the domain 
results in an inadequate strategy, which causes the development of a poor policy, which 
leads to the acquisition of inadequate technology, which provides for insufficient 
training. To avoid this chain reaction of failure, it is critical to treat mobile device 
72 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Mobile Device Strategy; United States 
Department of Defense, DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan. 
73 Symantec Corporation, “Infographic: Creating a Successful BYOD Policy,” September 15, 2014, 
http://www.slideshare.net/symantec/infographic-39117177; SAP SE, Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
Policy Guidebook. 
74 Pepin, “BYOD at IBM.” 
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incorporation as a complex system and to utilize the system engineering approach to 
ensure a success.  
In the next chapter, we use the system engineering approach to unveil the most 
suitable technology, part of four key ingredients to successful smartphone incorporation, 
to the Taiwan navy. The system engineering approach examines feasible solutions based 
on the Taiwan navy’s current problems, challenges, and needs regarding smartphone 
incorporation. Ultimately, the outcome of the next chapter will serve as a recommended 
building block to anchor the Taiwan navy’s uncertain thoughts about leveraging and 
incorporating smartphones into its force structure.  
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III. SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH 
With more than 100 ships and 40,000 personnel, the Taiwan navy is certainly a 
large and complex organization that can be viewed as a system. The International Council 
on System Engineering (INCOSE) system engineering handbook defines the term system 
as: 
A combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more 
stated purposes. 
An integrated set of elements, subsystems, or assemblies that accomplish a 
defined objective. These elements include products (hardware, software, 
firmware), processes, people, information, techniques, facilities, services, 
and other support elements.75  
The Taiwan navy perfectly fits the definition of a system, as do smartphone devices. 
Many will argue that one is an organization and the other is a device, and that they are 
very different in many levels. However, from a system engineer’s perspective, each of 
them is comprised of interacting elements to achieve certain goals, which resembles the 
essence of a system.  
In an environment where one system needs to integrate with another system, there 
are challenges, including short technology life-cycles, evolving technology, greater 
utilization of COTS, and dwindling resources. 76 Often when system development or 
integration is poorly managed, the results are low system effectiveness and high total 
cost.77 In order to achieve the right balance between effectiveness and cost, the Taiwan 
navy needs to use a system engineering approach to incorporate smartphone devices into 
its force structure. 
75 Cecilia Haskins, Systems Engineering Handbook: A Guide for System Life Cycle Processes and 
Activities, 3.2.2 ed. (San Diego, CA: International Council on Systems Engineering, 2011), 5. 
76 Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 4th ed. (Blacksburg, VA: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2008), 9. 
77 Ibid, 12–13. 
 33 
                                                 
A. DEFINITION OF SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
The INCOSE defines the term system engineering as 
an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful system. It focuses on defining customer needs and required 
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, 
and then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while 
considering the complete problem: operations, cost and schedule, 
performance, training and support, test, manufacturing, and disposal. SE 
considers both the business and the technical needs of all customers with 
the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs.78  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines system engineering as 
An approach to translate approved operational needs and requirements 
into operationally suitable blocks of systems. The approach shall consist 
of a top-down, iterative process of requirements analysis, functional 
analysis and allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system 
analysis and control. Systems engineering shall permeate design, 
manufacturing, test and evaluation, and support of the product. Systems 
engineering principles shall influence the balance between performance, 
risk, cost, and schedule.79  
Leveraging a system and system engineering approach in the Taiwan navy is the key to 
successful smartphone incorporation. It is important for the Taiwan navy to see itself as 
not only an organization, but as a system, and that a smartphone is not only an electronic 
device, but also a system that needs proper management to accomplish the desired 
objectives. System engineering is the appropriate approach to enable the realization of a 
successful system and the perfect balance between performance, risk, cost, and 
schedule.80 
B. APPROACH FRAMEWORK—VEE MODEL 
The Vee model is used to describe the life cycle of a system engineering process. 
It consists of two sides. The left side of the Vee represents the top-down evolution of user 
requirements into product design. The right side represents the bottom-up process of 
78 Haskins, Systems Engineering Handbook, 6. 
79 Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 17. 
80 Haskins, Systems Engineering Handbook, 7; Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 17. 
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system integration and verification.81 Furthermore, there are two axes associated with the 
Vee model: vertical time axis and horizontal maturity axis.82 The vertical axis represents 
the in-progress management activities that exist in both the left and right side of the Vee 
model. The horizontal axis represents the solution evaluation activities that connect both 
sides. 
 
Figure 5.  Vee Model83 
Figure 5 perfectly illustrates the interrelation between each of the seven stages 
within the Vee model. It is important to understand that the Vee model is not 
unidirectional but multidirectional. This multidirectional characteristic allows the system 
development to have a clear path in creating a mature product, while providing a 
feedback channel to validate and verify the product. 
81 Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 19. 
82 Haskins, Systems Engineering Handbook, 27–32. 
83 Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 29; Haskins, Systems Engineering Handbook, 28, 31. 
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The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) published by the U.S. DOD also 
provides insights about the Vee model. DAG’s Vee model is supported by 16 processes 
(eight technical processes, and eight technical management processes), as listed in Figure 
6.84 
  
Figure 6.  DAG Vee Model85 
In the DAG, these technical processes, along with the Vee model, provide a 
structured approach to increasing the likelihood that the capability being developed 
balances mission performance with cost, schedule, risk, and design constraints. 
Ultimately, the purpose of a system engineering approach is to provide a framework that 
allows organizations to efficiently and effectively deliver a capability or product to 
satisfy a validated operational need while reducing technical and programmatic risk.86  
84 United States Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Washington, DC: United 
States Department of Defense, 2013), 160–62. 
85 Ibid, 162. 
86 Ibid., 160–62. 
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1. Modified Vee Model for the Taiwan Navy 
Considering the conservative culture, limited resources, operational environment, 
and threat scenario, the Taiwan navy should scale the application and use of the Vee 
model to reflect the unique needs of the desired program or system being developed.87 
For the purpose of this analysis, first and foremost, we decided to replace the design and 
develop stages with just the COTS selection stage. This decision was made for numerous 
reasons, such as lower cost, faster and simpler development life-cycle, sufficient logistics 
and support, and better system maturity and reliability. Therefore, the Vee model for the 
Taiwan navy shown in Figure 7 is comprised of two main perspectives: the Taiwan navy 
and a COTS solution. 
In the Taiwan navy perspective, we define and analyze the stakeholder 
requirements to determine the desired functionalities and capabilities required to support 
naval operations. In the COTS solution perspective, we exam and compare the Android, 
iOS, and BlackBerry system to determine the best solution for the Taiwan navy.  
 
Figure 7.  The Taiwan Navy Vee Model 
87 Ibid, 162. 
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2. The Taiwan Navy Case (Problems, Challenges, and Needs) 
The Taiwan navy has always emphasized the significance of information security 
to preserve operational advantages over the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Navy. 
The PLA’s persistent espionage efforts towards Taiwan have resulted in several incidents 
that forced the Taiwan navy to continue to increase its information security measures. 
Although none of the Chinese espionage cases resulted in direct access to information, 
the growing use of mobile devices, along with sophisticated PLA cyberattack attempts, 
may result in a successful attack that gains direct access in the near future.88 
a. Problem 
The criticality of information security has made the Taiwan navy’s Information 
Technology (IT) structures and regulations cumbersome. This has slowed the Taiwan 
navy’s information flow and has crippled the information technology incorporation 
process, particularly for mobile devices. The crippled process results in ineffective plans 
and consequently not only undermines operational and administrative productivity but 
also poses a greater risk to security and maneuverability in information warfare.  
b. Challenge 
The challenge to the Taiwan navy is how to balance productivity and security in 
the information domain, while incorporating the existing mobile ecosystem. The dilemma 
of productivity and security has long been a challenge for many organizations in the 
information age. Raytheon research found that “52 percent of survey respondents say 
security practices on mobile devices have been sacrificed in order to improve employee 
productivity.”89 The struggle of solving this dilemma has either placed organizations at a 
great security risk or dramatically decreased the overall improvement to productivity 
offered by the device adoption. In recent years, the introduction of mobile device security 
measures such as trusted computing, virtualization, and application management has 
mitigated some of this dilemma. 
88 Peter Mattis, “China’s Espionage against Taiwan (Part I): Analysis of Recent Operation,” China 
Brief 14, no. 21 (November 7, 2014): 6. 
89 Ponemon Institute, LLC., Security in the New Mobile Ecosystem. 
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c. Need 
Ultimately, the Taiwan navy needs a comprehensive smartphone incorporation 
plan to address the dilemma between productivity and security. Since the Taiwan navy 
has always maintained high information security demands, we decided to first identify 
the most secure smartphone system and use it as the starting point for a successful 
smartphone incorporation plan. 
C. TAIWAN NAVY PERSPECTIVE 
During my three years of experience in the Taiwan navy as a junior officer 
onboard a surface ship, I had the opportunity to closely observe the information 
productivity and security issues encountered in both maritime and ashore scenarios. Often 
times, surface ships have only two phone lines and access to the Taiwan navy intranet 
when in port. To the officers onboard, these limited resources cannot satisfy their intense 
needs for unobstructed communications and up-to-date information, a situation often 
resulting in the use of personal mobile phones to make work-related calls or calls to 
colleagues in order to find out information not available on the ship’s intranet. To save 
personal expenses, many service members in the Taiwan navy have an extra Asia Pacific 
Telecommobile phone dedicated to work-related communications using its free in-net 
calls policy to limit their out-of-pocket cost. 90 The cumbersome information security 
regulations not only create inefficient communications but also keep surface ships from 
leveraging the computing technologies. In 2013, there still were some computers onboard 
my ship running the Intel Pentium 4 processor. 
The purpose of pointing out the constraints of the current Taiwan navy 
information policy is to introduce the advantages and potential of the mobile computing 
ecosystem, especially smartphone technologies and their related applications. These 
smartphones and their related applications provide the Taiwan navy a feasible solution to 
the dilemma of productivity and security.  
90 Asia Pacific Telecom, “Introduction to APT (Asia Pacific Telecom),” accessed February 24, 2015, 
http://ir.aptg.com.tw/en/APTIntroduction.htm. 
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1. System Requirements 
For an information system to operate in a military organization or environment, 
security is always the top priority in system requirements. There is no exception 
regarding smartphone incorporation in the Taiwan navy. The smartphone must satisfy the 
widely used information system security criteria: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, also known as the CIA triad. In the most recent United States Committee on 
National Security System (CNSS) Instruction 4009, released in April 2010, CNSS 
defines CIA as: 
• Confidentiality: the property that information is not disclosed to system 
entities (users, processes, devices) unless they have been authorized to 
access the information. 
• Integrity: the property whereby an entity has not been modified in an 
unauthorized manner. 
• Availability: the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by 
an authorized entity.  
Each criterion generates various system requirements for the smartphone such as 
encryption and authentication for confidentiality, file permission and user access control 
for integrity, and backup and recovery for availability. 
To benefit from smartphone incorporation, the Taiwan navy needs more than just 
a secure information system. It needs a secure and productive system. Other than meeting 
security requirements, a productive system also needs to meet usability requirements to 
become appealing and accepted to all of the stakeholders. The International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) defined the term usability in ISO 9241–11, published in 1998, 
as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use.”91 An 
information system with high security but low usability is often cumbersome and 
frustrating, eventually leading users to abandon the device or search for workarounds.92  
91 International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual 
display terminals (VDTs)—Part 11: Guidance on usability (Genève, Switzerland: ISO, 1998), 2. 
92 Skidmore, “App Wrapping.” 
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To make the system requirements more comprehensible to the stakeholders, we 
decided to present the requirements in the form of system capabilities. Based on security 
and usability requirements, we developed 15 suggested smartphone capabilities for the 
stakeholders in the Taiwan navy, as depicted in Table 4. Each capability is associated 
with a letter to show the corresponding requirement it aims to meet. 
Table 4.    System Capabilities Chart 
C: Confidentiality I: Integrity A: Availability U: Usability  
 System Capabilities S P 
1 Safe, secured, and encrypted communication channels C,I  
2 Safe, secure, and encrypted storages C,I  
3 User and device identification, authentication, and attestation C  
4 Antivirus and firewall I  
5 Mobile management (device and application) I  
6 Privacy protection (secure and anonymous web browsing) C  
7 Remote controls (lock, wipe, disable and recovery) C,A  
8 Self-diagnose and warning capability I  
9 Geo-fencing (location-based security service) A U 
10 Cost-efficient communication channels  U 
11 Low unit cost  U 
12 Powerful, practical, and popular designs and functionalities  U 
13 Sufficient and easy logistics and supports  U 
14 Entertainment and media (audio, photo, video, and game)  U 
15 Connectivity to the Taiwan navy intranet  U 
S is security and P is productivity 
 
2. Stakeholder Interests 
A stakeholder is defined as “a party that has an interest in an enterprise or 
project.”93 From our observation, and considering the context of smartphone use in the 
Taiwan navy, there are two “camps” of stakeholders distinguished by their respective 
understanding of the relationship between smartphones and information. One is 
conservative, and the other is adoptive. For the most part, shown in Table 5, the two 
93 Investopedia, “Stakeholder,” accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
s/stakeholder.asp.  
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groups understand and agree upon the importance of both smartphone security and 
productivity requirements except for the entertainment and media capability. The 
conservative stakeholder is concerned that the misuse of the capability may lead to 
information security incidents, such as classified information leakage and inappropriate 
information on social media that inevitably results in negativity in the press and damage 
to the image of the Taiwan navy. On the other hand, the adoptive stakeholder sees the 
entertainment and media capability as an opportunity, or a gateway, to the empowerment 
and reinvention of the Taiwan navy in the information age. Both groups show low 
interest to the Taiwan navy intranet connectivity capability simply because such 
connectivity defeats the purpose of creating a physically separated military network.  
Table 5.   Stakeholder Interests Chart 
■ High ■ Low 
 System Capabilities I II 
1 Safe, secured, and encrypted communication channels H H 
2 Safe, secure, and encrypted storages H H 
3 User and device identification, authentication, and attestation H H 
4 Antivirus and firewall H H 
5 Mobile management (device and application) H H 
6 Privacy protection (secure and anonymous web browsing) H H 
7 Remote controls (lock, wipe, disable, and recovery) H H 
8 Self-diagnose and warning capability H H 
9 Geo-fencing (location-based security service) H H 
10 Cost-efficient communication channels H H 
11 Low unit cost H H 
12 Powerful, practical, and popular designs and functionalities H H 
13 Sufficient and easy logistics and supports H H 
14 Entertainment and media (audio, photo, video, and game) L H 
15 Connectivity to the Taiwan navy intranet L L 
I is the conservative stakeholder and II is the adoptive stakeholder 
 
3. System Feasibility Analysis  
Ultimately, the Taiwan navy is searching for a trusted system that has most of the 
capabilities in Table 4. We only considered the COTS solution because it allows faster 
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procurement, shorter time to deployment, lower overall life-cycle cost, and less technical 
and financial risk compared to a custom developed or build-your-own approach. There 
are two considered approaches: a single COTS system and a combination of COTS 
systems and applications. A single COTS system approach is referring to the so-called 
ultra-secure smartphone, such as the Black smartphone from Boeing, the Blackphone 
from Silent Circle, the CryptoPhone from GSMK, and the Privacy Phone from 
FreedomPop.94 These smartphones were developed in light of increasing violations of 
customer privacy, awareness of government surveillance, and proliferation of spyware. 
Although these smartphones have started attracting attention in the smartphone market, 
most of them come with only limited proprietary applications pre-installed and have not 
yet established sufficient logistic and support infrastructure. Other pitfalls include being 
only Android-based, which limit user’s choices, and that their “ultra-secure calling and 
texting” only means applying encrypted voice over IP (VoIP) service over a cellular 
network, which requires an extra subscription fee.95  
Based on the information about these ultra-secure smartphones, Blackphone is our 
choice to represent the first approach because it has more specific and promising 
information available. It is selling for US$629 (plus shipping and any local taxes or 
duties for the destination address) and comes with a one-year subscription to its 
encrypted calling and texting, encrypted web browsing, and secure cloud backup 
services.96 The Blackphone’s customized Android supports all of the languages a regular 
Android does; however, Blackphone-specific applications do not support Chinese.97  
94 Boeing, “Boeing Black Smartphone,” accessed April 10, 2015, http://www.boeing.com/defense/
boeing-black/index.page; Blackphone, “Welcome to Blackphone,” accessed April 10, 2015, 
https://blackphone.ch/; ESD America Inc., “ESD CryptoPhone,” accessed April 10, 2015, 
http://esdcryptophone.com/; FreedomPop, “Privacy Phone,” accessed April 10, 2015, 
https://www.freedompop.com/theprivacyphone. 
95 Jill Scharr, “Blackphone vs. FreedomPop’s Privacy Phone: Security Showdown,” Tom’s Guide, 
March 7, 2014, http://www.tomsguide.com/us/blackphone-vs-freedompop-privacy-phone,news-
18427.html. 
96 Blackphone, “Blackphone,” accessed February 25, 2015, https://blackphone.ch/phone/. 
97 Blackphone, “What Languages Does Blackphone Support?,” August 2, 2014, 
https://support.blackphone.ch/customer/portal/articles/1565177. 
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The second approach, a combination of COTS systems and applications, is 
referring to regular smartphones with third-party applications. Although the regular 
smartphones are designed for the general public, it does not mean that they are not 
secure. In fact, the increasing public awareness and emphasis on mobile security have 
caused major smartphone manufacturers to improve and develop more secure 
smartphones. Apart from this, with the help of third-party applications, regular 
smartphones can fill the gaps that ultra-secure smartphones cannot. Ultimately, depicted 
in Table 6, the second approach has an edge over the first approach by providing the 
Taiwan navy with logistics and support services that are already well established, 
functionalities that are more versatile, and more choices for secure and efficient 
communication. 
Table 6.   System Feasibility Chart  
■ High feasibility ■ Low feasibility 
 System Capabilities I II* 
1 Safe, secured, and encrypted communication channels H H 
2 Safe, secure, and encrypted storages H H 
3 User and device identification, authentication, and attestation H H 
4 Antivirus and firewall H H 
5 Mobile Management (device and application) H H 
6 Privacy Protection (secure and anonymous web browsing) H H 
7 Remote controls (lock, wipe, disable, and recovery) H H 
8 Self-diagnose and warning capability H H 
9 Geo-fencing (location-based security service) H H 
10 Cost-efficient communication channels L H 
11 Low unit cost H H 
12 Powerful, practical, and popular designs and functionalities L H 
13 Sufficient and easy logistics and supports L H 
14 Entertainment and media (audio, photo, video, and game) H H 
15 Connectivity to the Taiwan navy intranet L L 
I is the single COTS system and II is the combination of COTS systems and 
applications 
*Most feasible approach 
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4. System Operational Requirements 
Our research is to provide the Taiwan navy with a viable smartphone 
incorporation option, not equipment certified for a combat environment. Smartphone 
devices may serve as a tool that helps increase the Taiwan navy’s information access and 
productivity while maintaining organizational security. Therefore, the operational 
requirements for the smartphone system used by this thesis as a basis for the Taiwan 
navy’s case are the same as those for regular consumer uses.  
D. SOLUTION PERSPECTIVE 
Through previous system requirement description and feasibility analysis, we 
recommend the Taiwan navy use the second option, a combination of COTS systems and 
applications. This option has lower technological risk and overall cost, higher system 
maturity and usability, and better supply and logistic support. To limit the endless 
possibility of different COTS systems and applications combinations, the solutions we 
proposed are limited to one OEM operating system including its built-in applications and 
two third-party applications. Based on Taiwan’s mobile market share and its navy’s 
security concerns, four OEM options are chosen: 1) Samsung Knox Android, 2) HTCpro 
Android, 3) Apple iOS, and 4) BlackBerry OS. We first analyze the four OEM options 
and then choose the third-party applications according to their strengths and weaknesses. 
1. OEM Option Analysis 
All four major smartphone manufacturers, Samsung, HTC, Apple, and 
BlackBerry, advertise their operating system as the best for enterprise mobility. 
BlackBerry has long been known for its leading role in mobile security development—it 
also became famous for being President Obama’s smartphone. Some Samsung and Apple 
products have received the approval from the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) for U.S. DOD use.98 HTC has partnered with IBM to address the needs of a 
corporate IT department to deploy appropriate mobile devices for secure enterprise 
98 Defense Information Systems Agency, “Secure Unclassified Mobile Devices and Wireless 
Services,” accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.disa.mil/Enterprise-Services/Mobility/Devices-and-
Wireless-Services.  
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mobility.99 In order to conduct a comparative analysis of all four options, we referenced 
the system capabilities chart depicted in Table 6 to identify three key functional areas and 
constructed a functionality chart (Figure 8). The key functional areas are security, 
management, and productivity. The first area, security, has always been the key concern 
for smartphones that operate in a military organization. The second area, management, is 
the key to optimize smartphone security, and productivity, the third key area, is the 
premise upon which adoption of smartphones is based. 
 
Figure 8.  Functionality Chart 
99 HTC Corporation, “HTCpro Partners,” accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.htcpro.com/
partners.  
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a. Samsung Knox Android 
Samsung Knox employs an Android OS designed from the ground up with 
security and management enhancements. Its three security aspects, platform security, 
application security, and mobile device management, provide the Knox with a strong 
defense against malicious attacks. For U.S. government and DOD installations, Knox 
also provides attestation, supports smartcard/common access card (CAC) applications, 
and obtains certification and validation from NIST and DISA.100 Table 7 summarizes the 
features and functionality in Samsung Knox and its related service. 
Table 7.   Samsung Knox101 
Features and Functionality 
Security 
1 Customizable Secure Boot 
2 TrustZone-based Integrity Measurement Architecture (TIMA)—Linux kernel protection 
3 Security Enhancements for Android 
4 ARM TrustZone hardware102—Trusted computing/root of trust 
5 On-device Data Encryption (256-bit AES cipher algorithm) 
6 Internal SD card 
7 Smartcard/CAC support 
8 Two-factor biometric authentication 
9 Samsung Knox Apps store—Apps review 
Management 
1 Application containers 
2 Cloud-based MDM capability—VPN and Wi-Fi provisioning 
3 MDM IT policies enforcement* 
4 Single sign-on 
5 Device location and status tracking 
6 Remote lock, wipe, and passcode reset 
7 User activity report 
100 Samsung Electronics, An Overview of Samsung Knox (white paper) (Suwon-si, Korea: Samsung, 
June 2013), http://www.samsung.com/global/business/business-images/resource/white-paper/2014/02/
Samsung_KNOX_whitepaper_June-0-0.pdf. 
101 Samsung Electronics, An Overview of Samsung Knox; Samsung Electronics, “Samsung Knox: 
Business Protection. Personal Privacy. One Device,” accessed February 28, 2015, 
http://www.samsung.com/us/business/samsung-for-enterprise/downloads/KnoxBrochureSTA05_14.pdf; 
Samsung Electronics, “Knox Workspace—Technical Details,” accessed February 28, 2015, 
https://www.samsungknox.com/en/products/knox-workspace/technical. 
102 ARM, “TrustZone,” accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.arm.com/products/processors/
technologies/trustzone/index.php. 
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Productivity 
1 VPN (per-app feature) 
2 Samsung Knox Apps
103—secure email, planner, contacts, camera 
and gallery, and browser, file & notes. 
3 Samsung Knox Apps store
104—conference call, notes, files share, 
cloud storage, communication, print, etc. 
*May vary by MDM partners 
 
The Samsung Knox Android does not have additional mobile call/text message 
encryption mechanisms or built-in antivirus/firewall functions factory-installed within the 
OS. Unlike the Apple iOS, Knox needs third-party services to provide cloud storage and 
conference call functionalities. These functional shortcomings can be easily remediated 
by third-party applications. The analysis and research also reveal that the Knox OS and 
factory-installed applications cannot realize the location-based security feature. It needs 
additional location monitoring and tracking infrastructure.105 
We color-coded the functionality chart to provide a more comprehensive picture 
of the OEM option analysis. The color codes are green (strong), blue (moderate), and red 
(weak). The gradient color scheme represents the third-party applications improvement. 
In the Samsung Knox android option that depicted in Figure 9, we decided to use the 
Avast Mobile Security & Antivirus and GoToMeeting applications to improve its 
antivirus/firewall and conference call functionality.106 
103 Samsung Electronics, “Knox Workspace—Powerful Apps,” accessed February 28, 2015, 
https://www.samsungknox.com/en/products/knox-workspace/features/powerful-apps#Camera-and-Gallery. 
104 Samsung Electronics, “Samsung Knox Apps,” accessed February 28, 2015, 
https://www.samsungKnox.com/en/products/Knox-workspace/features/apps. 
105 AirPatrol Corporation, “ZoneDefense Location-Based Mobile Security Platform,” accessed 
February 28, 2015, http://airpatrolcorp.com/products/zonedefense/#zd.  
106 Google Play, “Mobile Security & Antivirus—AVAST Software,” accessed February 28, 2015, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.avast.android.mobilesecurity&hl=en; Google Play, 
“GoToMeeting—Citrix,” accessed February 28, 2015, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.citrixonline.android.gotomeeting&hl=en. 
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Figure 9.  Samsung Knox Functional Analysis 
b. HTCpro Android 
HTCpro is a certification provided by the HTC Corporation to promote its 
enterprise-ready smartphone products. The HTCpro certified Android OS features data 
encryption technology, MDM, and VPN functions to improve the Android mobile 
security. It also provides various applications, including email, calendar, notes, online 
storage, and Wi-Fi sharing and printing, to enhance the user’s experience and 
productivity. 107  Table 8 summarized the HTCpro Android features with respect to 
security, management, and productivity. 




                                                 
Table 8.   HTCpro Android108 
Features and Functionality 
Security 1 Data Encryption (256-bit AES Encryption engine) 
Management 1 
MDM (Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync® or third-party MDM 
solutions) 
2 Remote lock and wipe 
Productivity 
1 VPN (native Android platform and third-party VPN solutions) 
2 
HTC Sense®-enabled productivity capabilities—HTC BlinkFeed 
(customizable home screen), HTC Zoe (social app), HTC 
BoomSound (premium quality sound), and HTC Sense TV (TV + 
phone integration) 
3 Enhanced email and calendar functions including filtered email searches and cross–time-zone scheduling 
4 Wi-Fi sharing and remote printing 
 
One significant disadvantage of HTCpro is the lack of an official endorsement. 
Currently, no government entity has granted the HTCpro Android approval for use. 
Throughout our research, we also found the lack of detailed technical specifications and 
explanation about the HTCpro Android alarming. This has led us to believe that the 
HTCpro is more of a fancy business advertisement than a real technology development. 
Based on the information in hand, we decided to pair the same third-party applications 
used in the Samsung Knox option with the HTCpro to increase its antivirus/firewall and 
conference call functionality. Figure 10 depicts the results of HTCpro functional analysis. 
108 HTC Corporation, “The Award-Winning New HTC One Is Enterprise Ready”; HTC Corporation, 
“HTCpro Certified,” accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.htcpro.com/business-solutions.  
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Figure 10.  HTCpro Functional Analysis 
c. Apple iOS 
The iOS, originally iPhone OS, is the mobile operating system developed by 
Apple. In Chapter II we mentioned that the iOS is the most secure operating system on 
the market.109 In the official Apple document, iOS Security, the first sentence to open the 
chapter reads: “Apple designed the iOS platform with security at its core,” a statement 
validated by approval from DISA.110 The uniqueness of iOS security is that it protects 
109 Timberg, “Why Surveillance Companies Hate the iPhone.” 
110 Apple Inc., iOS Security, 4; Defense Information Systems Agency, “Secure Unclassified Mobile 
Devices and Wireless Services.” 
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not only the device but the entire Apple ecosystem. 111 Referencing the iOS security 
publication, we summarized the features and functionality of the latest iOS in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Apple iOS112 
Features and Functionality 
Security 
1 Secure boot chain—Hardware root of trust 
2 System software authorization—software integrity verification and protection 
3 Passcode and Touch ID (biometric identification—fingerprint)  
4 One dedicated AES 256-bit crypto engine 
5 Effaceable Storage—deep level data erasure against data remnant exploit 
6 App code signing—Apple App store review and certification  
7 App sandboxing  
8 Apple ID 
Management 
1 Single Sign-on 
2 
MDM Capabilities—Passcode management, configuration 
enforcement, device enrollment program, Apple configurator, 
device restrictions, and supervised-only restrictions 
3 Remote wipe 
4 Find My iPhone and Activation Lock—device location tracking and remote lock 
5 Privacy control 
Productivity 
1 SSL, TLS, DTLS, and VPN—Network security* 
2 AirDrop—secure files transfer/share (2048-bit RSA identity hash)  
3 iMessage (RSA 1280-bit encryption key and ECDSA 256-bit signing key) 
4 FaceTime—video and audio calling service (AES 256-bit encryption) 
5 iCloud—online storage (AES 128-bit encryption and SHA 256-bit hash) 
6 Handoff—work/task continuity** 
7 Hotspot—Internet connectivity sharing 
*SSL: Secure Socket Layer, TLS: Transport Layer Security, DTLS: Datagram 
Transport Layer Security 
**Continuity features allow seamlessly work/task transfer between iOS devices 
(features may vary by different system requirements) 
 
111 Apple Inc., iOS Security. 
112 Ibid. 
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Overall, Apple iOS has strong performance across the functionality chart depicted 
in Figure 11 except for location-based security. Although many MDM/MAM solutions 
provide security policy enforcement or application disablement, the inability to carry out 
location-based execution is the biggest obstacle for productivity and security 
management. Better management that can satisfy both productivity and security demands 
requires finer-grained control over location-based information. Since Apple iOS meets 
most of the desired functions, it does not need third-party applications to remediate its 
functionality. However, for comparative analysis, we decided to use Google Drive for 
larger free online storage capacity (15 GB vs 5 GB on iCloud) and GoToMeeting for 
conference calls across different mobile platforms and operating systems. 
 
Figure 11.  Apple iOS Functional Analysis 
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d. BlackBerry 10 OS 
BlackBerry Limited, formerly Research In Motion (RIM) Limited, was known for 
its first portable email device back in 1999.113 Throughout the early 2000s, it became the 
indispensable accessory of business executives and heads of states until the introduction 
of iPhone and Android.114 Although BlackBerry’s Taiwan market share is insignificant 
compared to other popular smartphone makers and its recent business strategy shift in 
focus from device to software, BlackBerry is still the world leader in the enterprise 
mobility products and services.115 The latest mobile platform released by BlackBerry, the 
BlackBerry 10, features various productivity and security features,  such as hardware root 
of trust, MDM/MAM, data-in-transit/at-rest security, task/note/memo organization, and 
centralized emails/messages control.116 Referencing various BlackBerry official websites 
and publications, we summarized the features and functionality of the latest BlackBerry 
10 OS in Table 10. 
113 BlackBerry Limited, “BlackBerry Charts New Course by Officially Adopting Its Iconic Brand 
Name,” July 10, 2013, http://press.blackberry.com/press/2013/blackberry-brand-name.html; Kevin C. 
Tofel, “BlackBerry: The One Time Smartphone Leader, Its Fall, and the Comeback That Never 
Happened,” Octover 1, 2013, GigaOM Media, https://gigaom.com/2013/10/01/blackberry-the-one-time-
smartphone-leader-its-fall-and-the-comeback-that-never-happened/.  
114 Felix Gillette, Diane Brady, and Caroline Winter, “The Rise and Fall of BlackBerry: An Oral 
History,” Bloomberg, December 5, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-12-05/the-rise-and-
fall-of-blackberry-an-oral-history#p1.  
115 International Data Corporation, “IDC Taiwan,” March 18, 2014, http://www.idc.com.tw/about/
433.html; Forbes, “New BlackBerry Smartphones Signal Shift in Focus to Enterprise Services and BBM,” 
February 28, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/02/28/new-blackberry-
smartphones-signal-shift-in-focus-to-enterprise-services-and-bbm/.  
116 BlackBerry, BlackBerry Security Overview (Waterloo, Ontario: BlackBerry, March 2015), 
http://help.blackberry.com/en/blackberry-security-overview/latest/blackberry-security-overview-pdf/
Security_Overview_BlackBerry_en.pdf; BlackBerry, “BlackBerry 10 Re-Designed Re-Engineered and Re-
Invented,” January 30, 2013, http://press.blackberry.com/press/2013/blackberry-10-re-designed-re-
engineered-and-re-invented.html.  
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Table 10.   BlackBerry 10 OS117 
Features and Functionality 
Security 
1 Hardware root of trust—trusted computing/attestation 
2 BlackBerry Guardian—App vetting (Allowed/Disallowed App List) 
3 Passcode and two-factor authentication (smart cards) 
4 Microkernel architecture—less exposure to kernel exploits/attacks118  
5 Data-in-transit security—designated BlackBerry infrastructure and AES 256-bit encryption 
6 Date-at-rest security—AES 256-bit encryption 
7 App sandboxing 
8 Internal and external storage encryption119 
Management 
1 BlackBerry Protect—remote location tracking, lock, password reset, wipe 
2 BlackBerry Blend—remote access/work continuity 
3 BlackBerry Balance—MDM/MAM (including NAC*)  
4 
BES 12—Cross-platforms (iOS, Android, Windows Phone, 
Samsung Knox and BlackBerry devices) Enterprise Mobility 
Management by BlackBerry120 
Productivity 
1 VPN 
2 BBM—secure messaging service  
3 BBM Meeting—mobile collaboration 
4 Amazon Appstore—Android Apps downloads** 
*Network Access Control 
**BlackBerry 10 OS can run Android Apps that are being securely controlled (App 
sandboxing and containerization, review, and certification)121 
 
117 BlackBerry, BlackBerry Security Overview. 






119 BlackBerry, “How to Encrypt Internal and External File Systems on BlackBerry Smartphones,” last 
modified August 26, 2014, http://btsc.webapps.blackberry.com/btsc/
viewdocument.do?externalId=KB16088&sliceId=2&cmd=displayKC&docType=kc&noCount=true&View
edDocsListHelper=com.kanisa.apps.common.BaseViewedDocsListHelperImpl.  
120 BlackBerry, “BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12,” accessed March 3, 2015, http://us.blackberry.com/
enterprise/products/bes12.html.  
121 Michael Cobb, “BB10 Security: The Risks of Running Android Apps on BlackBerry 10,” 
TechTarget, June 2013, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/BB10-security-The-risks-of-running-
Android-apps-on-BlackBerry-10.  
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The BlackBerry may not be one of the more popular smartphone choices for the 
public, but it is indeed the most popular smartphone choice for government agencies and 
regulated industries such as financial and healthcare services.122 By focusing more on the 
Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) capability development, BlackBerry has 
transformed itself from a phone maker to EMM service provider. Its BES 12, a cross-
platform EMM solution, is by far the most impressive and powerful MDM/MAM 
solution and allows better mobile strategic options (BYOD, COPE, CYOD, and COBO), 
execution, and user experience. The Connect to Dropbox and GoToMeeting are our 
chosen third-party applications for the BlackBerry option.123 The former is for better 
work productivity and larger online storage, and the latter is for easier and popular 
conference/meeting calls in general use. Same as all three previous analyzed 
smartphones, the location-based security feature is absent from the BlackBerry 10 OS. 
Figure 12 depicts the results of BlackBerry 10 OS functional analysis.  
122 BlackBerry, “Enterprise-Grade Security for Regulated Industries,” accessed March 3, 2015, 
http://us.blackberry.com/enterprise/solutions/regulated-industries.html.  





                                                 
 
Figure 12.  BlackBerry 10 OS Functional Analysis 
2. Recommended Option 
The analysis reveals that Apple iOS is the most secure and productive system for 
smartphone incorporation in the Taiwan navy. It shows strong performance across the 
functionality chart except the location-based security management, which requires more 
than a combination of a smartphone and applications to achieve acceptable performance 
and practicality. The second best option is BlackBerry, which shows the same 
performance as Apple iOS only after combining it with third-party applications. Although 
the BlackBerry misses the Apple iOS only by not having its own cloud storage service, 
which is a minor productivity issue, its marginal market share, which creates insignificant 
supportability, in the Taiwan smartphone market is in fact the deciding factor to rank the 
Apple iOS over the BlackBerry. Table 11 quantifies the findings of functional analyses. 
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All four options score only one point at management area due to the lack of location-
based security management function.  
Table 11.   Analysis Summary 
Rank Security Management Productivity Total 
1 Apple iOS 3 1 3 7 
2 BlackBerry 3 1 3 7 
3 Samsung Knox 2 1 2 5 
4 HTCpro 1 1 2 4 
The scoring is based on the results of functional analysis in three key areas 
Strong performance: 3 points, medium performance: 2 points, and weak performance: 1 
point 
 
Modern smartphones are capable of using GPS, WLAN, and Cell ID signals to 
provide users with location-based and geosocial services such as navigation, proximity-
based marketing, location tracking, and travel information.124 Current studies show that 
the positioning accuracy in smartphones depends on various factors including weather 
conditions, the operating system, and the positioning scheme (single vs. hybrid). 125 
Generally, smartphones can get within 5 to 8 meters accuracy that can be improved to 2 
to 3 meters by incorporating external Bluetooth GPS receivers.126 Nevertheless, using 
location-based information to build an effective and practical security management 
requires higher and constant positioning accuracy. Otherwise, the inadequate and 
inconsistent accuracy will result in high security risk and low usability.  
An intriguing significance of location-based security is that theoretically, it can 
relieve smartphone users’ burden and inconvenience in the dual persona use case, which 
124 Christine Bauer, “On the (In-) Accuracy of GPS Measures of Smartphones: A Study of Running 
Tracking Applications,” paper presented at the 11th International Conference on Advances in Mobile 
Computing & Multimedia (MoMM2013), Vienna, Austria, December 2013; Kathryn Zickuhr, “Three-
Quarters of Smartphone Owners Use Location-Based Services,” Pew Research Center, May 11, 2012, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/05/11/three-quarters-of-smartphone-owners-use-location-based-services/; 
Ryan Goodrich, “Location-Based Services: Definition & Examples,” Business News Daily, October 30, 
2013, http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/5386-location-based-services.html.   
125 Bauer, “On the (In-) Accuracy of GPS Measures of Smartphones.” 
126 Community Health Maps, “How Accurate is the GPS on My Smart Phone (Part 2),” July 7, 2014, 
http://communityhealthmaps.nlm.nih.gov/2014/07/07/how-accurate-is-the-gps-on-my-smart-phone-part-2/.  
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requires user to adopt dual mobile operating environments, and allow finer-grained 
smartphone security implementation. Imagine having a smartphone that is capable of 
disabling camera and microphone upon entering a combat information center and 
resuming normal settings upon exit. Imagine a smartphone that switches to work mode at 
the office and switches to personal mode during a lunch break at a local Starbucks. 
Recently, Google and Apple both applied for new patents involving location-based 
(location-sensitive) security features127 aimed at improving security implementation and 
user experience. 
However, the location-based security service is a double-edged sword. In order to 
implement appropriate geo-sensitive security measures, users need to be located and 
tracked constantly, which poses serious threats to privacy issues such as unauthorized 
access to personal information and force locations/movements. In addition, a smartphone 
alone is unlikely to support reliable smartphone positioning for security implementation 
due to its limited computing power and system resources. Therefore, realizing intuitive 
and intelligent location-based security services depends on how to overcome privacy 
concerns effectively and how to locate smartphones accurately so that it truly reduces 
instead of escalating anxiety regarding smartphone security. 
E. MARITIME MOBILITY 
Maritime mobility is a concept used to describe the capability to establish wireless 
network connections for mobile devices in maritime environments. To make the Taiwan 
navy a truly mobile enterprise both ashore and at sea, a secure, productive mobile device 
is not enough. Especially in order to leverage smartphones at sea, the Taiwan navy needs 
a way to connect the device to the rest of the world. It needs satellite and wireless 
communication at sea as a backhaul to the smartphone connectivity. That being said, the 
productivity enhancements offered by the adoption of smartphones may be in-part 
127 Alex Colon, “Google’s Location-Based Security System Can Protect Your Phone Whenever You 
Leave the House,” GigaOM Media, August 22, 2013, https://gigaom.com/2013/08/22/googles-location-
based-security-system-can-protect-your-phone-whenever-you-leave-the-house/; Jack Purcher, “Apple 
Invents Intelligent Location-Based Security for Home & CarPlay,” Patently Apple, July 3, 2014, 
http://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2014/07/apple-invents-intelligent-location-based-security-
for-home-carplay.html.    
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realized with the devices being used as terminals to onboard systems, subject to approval 
by the overriding security policy. 
The vastness and remoteness of the ocean are the challenges all navies face while 
trying to stay connected. The ocean carries the ships and connects the world. However, it 
does so in the physical domain, not in the information domain where the maritime 
mobility resides. The U.S. Navy has been expanding its maritime mobility since 2008 
when it attempted to establish a wireless ship-to-shore connection system to 2013 when it 
set the goal to bring Wi-Fi and 4G LTE networks to ships and submarines.128 
The differences in operational environment and characteristics have forced the 
Taiwan navy to approach maritime mobility differently. It does have capable maritime 
mobility for military tactical networks, ranging from encrypted ship-to-shore Wi-Fi 
connection to satellite command and control (C2) tactical networks. However, the 
maritime mobility for commercial networks is almost nonexistent due to security 
concerns and maritime environmental challenges the U.S. Navy also faced. 129  The 
maritime mobility for commercial network consists of two key nodes: satellite and 
wireless area communication node.  
1. Satellite Communication 
The idea of satellite communication (SATCOM) started from a Royal Air Force 
(RAF) electronic officer named Arthur C. Clarke who described the possibility of 
SATCOM in his short article published in 1945 in Wireless World.130 Today, exactly 70 
years from the very beginnings of SATCOM, there are more than 600 operational 
128 Heather Meredith et al., “Navy Ship-to-Shore via Wireless Connection,” CHIPS 26, no. 4 (October–
December 2008): 58; Sam Fellman, “Wi-Fi Coming To U.S. Ships, Subs,” Defense News, October 16, 
2013, http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20131016/DEFREG02/310160016/Wi-Fi-Coming-US-Ships-
Subs; Greg Crowe, “Navy’s Ship-to-Ship Communications Go 4G,” Government Computer News, March 
11, 2013, http://gcn.com/articles/2013/03/11/navy-4gs-ship-to-ship-communications.aspx.  
129 Crowe, “Navy’s Ship-to-Ship Communications Go 4G.”  
130 David J. Whalen, “Communications Satellites Short History,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, accessed March 6, 2015, http://history.nasa.gov/satcomhistory.html.  
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satellites listed for communication use that collectively provide worldwide coverage.131 
Unlike the United States, Taiwan does not have dedicated military communication 
satellites and only has part ownership of one commercial communication satellite, ST-2, 
which provides services for both commercial and military communications.132 This does 
not mean that the Taiwan navy should not rely on commercial satellites for military 
applications. In fact, commercial satellites currently support approximately 40% of the 
U.S. DOD SATCOM demands, which are estimated to grow by 68% over the next 
decade.133 
a. Current Development 
Satellites with different purposes operate at different frequencies. Figure 13 
shows that typical SATCOM transmissions use frequencies that range from 1 to 40 GHz. 
Within the frequency range, designations have been developed for easier reference.134 
131 Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,” accessed March 6, 2015, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-
database.html#.VPnvAeGraVA.  
132 SatBeams.com, “Satellite Details—ST 2,” accessed March 6, 2015, https://www.satbeams.com/
satellites?norad=37606.  
133 Defense Business Board, Taking Advantage of Opportunities for Commercial Satellite 




134 European Space Agency, “Satellite Frequency Bands,” November 21, 2013, http://www.esa.int/
Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Satellite_frequency_bands.  
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Figure 13.  SATCOM Frequency Designations135 
Due to the increasing demands for SATCOM, congestion has become a serious 
issue in the earlier developed lower frequency bands (L, S, and C). To meet the market 
demands, the SATCOM industry has been using the higher frequency bands such as Ku 
(12–18 GHz) and Ka (26–40 GHz) for broader bandwidth access. 136  Currently, the 
SATCOM industry is using the Ku and Ka bands to develop better, more efficient, and 
higher performance satellites, called high-throughput satellites (HTS). The HTSs use 
multiple spot-beam antennas and frequency reuse mechanisms to provide five to ten 
times the capacity of traditional satellites. This is equivalent to a data rate increase of 
upward to 100 Mbps to a single site.137 Table 12 provides the ITC Global summary of 
four of the more prominent HTS satellite systems emerging on the market. 
135 Ibid.  
136 Ibid. 
137 Harris CapRock Communications, Not All Bands Are Created Equal: A Closer Look at Ka & Ku 
High Throughput Satellites (Houston, TX: Harris CapRock Communications), accessed March 11, 2015, 
http://www.harriscaprock.com/downloads/HarrisCapRock_WhitePaper-Ka-Ku_Analysis.pdf.  
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Table 12.   Prominent HTS Satellite Systems138 
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(Telstar 12V) 
For information purposes only. All data is from publically available sources. Intelsat Epic, Inmarsat Global 
Xpress, O3b, and Telesat VANTAGE are trademarks of their respective owners. No endorsement or 
commentary implied. 
138 ITC Global, “High Throughput Satellites,” accessed March 11, 2015, http://www.itcglobal.net/high-
throughput-satellites.htm.  
139 Intelsat, “Intelsat EpicNG® Coverage,” accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.intelsat.com/
infrastructure/intelsat-epicng/coverage/.  
140 O3b Networks, What Is Network Latency and Why Does It Matter?, accessed April 27, 2015, 
http://www.o3bnetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/white-paper_latency-matters.pdf.    
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b. Battle of Bands: Ka vs. Ku 
The debate over Ka band versus Ku band is intense, and each side provides 
valuable arguments on why one is better than the other to serve as the future SATCOM 
solution. In short, the Ka SATCOM technology is newer, but it also means that the Ku 
has more SATCOM infrastructure in place. The higher frequency of Ka band allows 
higher throughput, but it also means that the Ku has better resistance to atmospheric 
interference. However, as John Ashworth, the O3b Networks’ principal engineer stated, 
“Debates about one band versus another distract us from focusing on how best to make 
use of this rich range of resources to best serve our communications needs.”141 To the 
Taiwan navy, understanding the difference between the Ka and Ku band is beneficial to 
understanding SATCOM development, but it should not occupy the decision process of 
choosing the best SATCOM options for the Taiwan navy. 
c. SATCOM Options for the Taiwan Navy 
When we look into SATCOM options for the Taiwan navy, we are specifically 
referring to satellite Internet access or so called IP communications over satellite. There 
are two popular options for global access: BGAN (Broadband Global Area Network) and 
VSAT (Very Small Apertures Terminals).142 BGAN uses Inmarsat I-4 constellation, and 
VSAT operates on other satellite carriers to provide reliable Internet connections to 
remote locations worldwide.143 Strictly speaking, the Taiwan navy is a green water navy. 
However, it is fully capable of executing blue water missions that may demand 
SATCOM to enhance C2 capability. In Table 13, we listed some of the main differences 
between BGAN and VSAT to help the Taiwan navy determine which of the two options 
is best suited for its specific situations and requirements. 144  As typical commercial 
network consumers expect upward of 10 MB per second connection service, neither of 
141 John Ashworth, “The ‘Great’ Debate: Ka-Band versus Ku-Band,” O3b Networks (blog), January 9, 
2013, https://o3bnetworks.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/the-great-debate-ka-band-vs-ku-band/.  
142 Network Innovations, “BGAN or VSAT—Comparing the Technologies,” April 26, 2012, 
http://www.networkinv.com/bgan-or-vsat-comparing-the-technologies/.  
143 Ground Control, “BGAN Coverage Map,” February 24, 2015, http://www.groundcontrol.com/
bgan_coverage_map.htm; Network Innovations, “BGAN or VSAT—Comparing the Technologies.” 
144 Ibid. 
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these services would satisfy consumer demand on a continuous basis. However, the rates 
offered by these services are within the demands for operational requirements. 
Table 13.   BGAN vs. VSAT145 
 BGAN VSAT 
Data Volumes Better for short-term small amount of data transfer 
Better for long-term large amount of 
data (hundreds of megabytes or 
gigabytes) transfer 
Link Speed 
Standard/Shared IP: peak 490Kbps* 
Streaming/Dedicated IP: selectable 32 
to 384Kbps 
Selectable 64Kbps to multiple Mbps 
Number of 
Concurrent Users 
Better for single user or small teams 
who have sporadic usage patterns 
Better for large operations with multiple 
users and continuous usage patterns 
Capital Cost 
Directional antennas: US$3,000 to 
5,000 
Auto-tracking units: US$8,000 to 
18,000 
Cost varies dramatically 
Entry level: US$3,000 but can be tens 
of thousands for large operations 
Auto-pointing system: 
US$20,000 to 200,000 
Operating Cost US$3 to 7 per Megabyte of data transfer/received 
Often fixed monthly fee: US$200 to 
20,000 per month based on bandwidth 
Coverage Seamless near global network except poles 
Similar to BGAN coverage but need 
separate satellite network contracts to 
achieve global coverage 
Ease of Use Simple and easy to use, customer installable, no technician required 
Trained technician required for 
installations 
Form Factor 
BGAN is about laptop computer size 
and includes rechargeable batteries for 
operation 
1 to 2.4 m diameter** VSAT for most 
applications and needs to be tethered to 
a power source for operation 
Communications 
On the Move 
Best option for land use applications 
(smaller antennas for moving vehicles) 
Best option for maritime use 
applications (larger antennas for 
underway ships) 
Licensing Less expensive in general More expensive in general 
*On February 2, 2015 Inmarsat launched the second HTS for its Global Xpress constellation that brings 
consistent high-speed connectivity of up to 50 Mbps on download and 5Mbps on upload146 
** World’s smallest VSAT is the KVH TracPhone V3 measuring just 37cm in diameter147 
145 Ibid. 
146 Jonathan Amos, “Inmarsat Launches Second Global Xpress Satellite,” British Broadcasting 
Corporation, February 2, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-31097265; Inmarsat and 
IEC Telecom, Global Xpress, accessed March 11, 2015, http://www.iec-telecom.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/iec_telecom_datasheet_global_xpress_service_v5.pdf.  
147 KVH Industries, Inc., “KVH’s New TracPhone V3, World’s Smallest Ku-Band Maritime VSAT 
Terminal, Receives FCC License,” April 27, 2011, http://www.kvh.com/Press-Room/Press-Release-
Library/2011/110427-V3-Licensed-Shipping.aspx.  
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2. Wireless Area Communication 
The Taiwan navy has always worked hard to establish reliable and efficient 
communication networks such as HF, VHF, UHF, and tactical data links to deployed 
vessels. Although these networks prove useful and reliable most of the time, they also 
have clunky terminals that require skilled sailors to operate. Commercial wireless 
networking technology can dramatically improve current network efficiency and ease 
training requirements for operators. However, it is not to supplant but to supplement 
existing naval tactical networks.148 
Embracing commercial wireless networking technology in naval environments 
has many potential benefits depending on the wireless network area size. Furthermore, 
the wireless networking technology can expand SATCOM footprints without installing 
expensive SATCOM terminals on every ship in the Taiwan navy. Table 14 shows a short 
list of current popular COTS wireless networking technologies and potential applications 
in the Taiwan navy. 
148 Spencer Ackerman, “In First, Navy Will Put 4G Network on Ships,” Wired, May 23, 2012, 
http://www.wired.com/2012/05/navy-wwan/.  
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Table 14.   Wireless Networking Benefits 
Area Size149 Technology Naval Application 
1 to 10 meters 
(WPAN)* 
Bluetooth 
Onboard mobile devices mirroring, direct files 
sharing/transfer and audio/video streaming  Wi-Fi Direct 
LTE Direct 




Shipwide network connection and 
Internet/intranet access, in port ship-to-shore 
network connection 
107m to 56km 
(WMAN) WiMAX  Underway SAG**, ship-to-ship, ship-to-air 
network connection, audio/video streaming, 





*WPAN (Wireless Personal Area Network), WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network), 
WMAN (Wireless Metropolitan Area Network), and WWAN (Wireless Wide Area 
Network) 
**SAG (Surface Action Group) 
 
After identifying the appropriate and necessary technological components to be 
incorporated in the Taiwan navy, there is still more to be done before creating an 
acceptable smartphone incorporation plan. One thing in particular is execution of a pilot 
program. Through the pilot program, the technological components can be further 
evaluated and verified. More importantly, the pilot program allows the Taiwan navy to 
see the role that technology plays and the limitation that technology has in the overall 
smartphone incorporation process in order to develop corresponding strategy, policy, and 
training. 
  
149 Mark D. Ciampa, CWNA Guide to Wireless LANs, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: CENGAGE Learning, 
2012), 21. 
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IV. SMARTPHONE INCORPORATION PILOT PROGRAM 
Smartphone incorporation is a reinvention, not a revolution, for the Taiwan 
navy’s information security practice. A proper reinvention first needs a proper evaluation 
to justify the pros and cons. For this reason the Taiwan navy should conduct a pilot 
program. The pilot program’s purposes are to identify any disconnect between the policy-
maker and the frontline user, misunderstanding between prediction and reality, and any 
misalignment between the stated problem and proposed solutions. Negligence of a pilot 
program likely leads to an ineffective incorporation that fails to recognize deficiencies in 
strategy, policy, technology, and training. Ultimately, the ineffective smartphone 
incorporation will impair the Taiwan navy’s information security practice instead of 
improving it. Due to the scope and investment of this study, the smartphone incorporation 
pilot program for the Taiwan navy is in fact only a limited objective experiment (LOE). 
In the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan, FY 2004–2011, 
an LOE is defined as “a narrowly scoped, analytically focused concept assessment or 
prototype validation event. It provides final dress rehearsal of a concept or major 
component of a concept prior to its final validation in a full joint warfighting 
experiment.”150 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the Taiwan navy smartphone incorporation pilot program as 
proposed herein is to reveal the potential influence of smartphone applications upon the 
Taiwan navy via selected experiments that realistically represent ashore and maritime 
scenarios in order to assess the utility and feasibility of the smartphone incorporation.  
1. Objectives 
The objectives of the proposed pilot program are: 
150 United States Joint Force Command, Delivering Innovation: The Joint Concept Development and 
Experimentation Campaign Plan FY2004–2011 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 
January 26, 2004), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/deliver_innov.pdf.  
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1. Collect data for smartphone incorporation concept assessment and 
influence analysis.  
2. Provide the Taiwan navy with quantitative measures to answer 
specific research questions and operational concerns associated 
with smartphone incorporation.151 
2. Participants 
To account for unforeseen information and operational security risks while 
conducting the pilot program, we form a low-risk pilot group comprised of naval 
personnel of various ranks, from various units, at different levels of the Taiwan navy. 
Furthermore, in order to realistically represent ashore and maritime conditions, the 
selection of participants will be based on a complete chain of command related to a 
desired event. Chain of command constitutes the information flow in military operations. 
Participants comprised of an incomplete chain of command can reveal only an 
incomplete picture of the smartphone influence to the Taiwan navy. The incomplete 
picture often leads to a faulty assessment, which defeats the purpose of the pilot program.  
B. PROGRAM 
To answer the specific research questions identified in Chapter I and the 
operational concerns the Taiwan navy has towards smartphone incorporation, the 
program is comprised of three scenario-based experiments. These experiments represent 
the most common events seen in the Taiwan navy operations and aim to reveal the 
influence of security, productivity, cost, and user experience on the selection of a 
smartphone solution for the Taiwan navy.  
1. Rules 
Rules are set to establish safe boundaries for the experiments. They must be 
followed to ensure the credibility, reliability, and integrity of the results gathered from 
the experiments. Table 15 lists the rules and regulations that are developed to allow the 
establishment of the least risky and most realistic experimental environment.  
151 Ibid. 
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Table 15.   Rules 
Rules 
1 All experiments must not involve materials that may compromise the Taiwan navy warfighting capabilities 
2 All experiments should be conducted under the assumption of no subsidy 
3 
All smartphones involved in experiments are required to comply to the followings: 
• For iOS: Apply the latest software updates; jailbreak forbidden; and set up auto-
lock, passcode/touch ID and Find My iPhone app 
• For Android: Apply the latest software updates; set up auto-lock; 
passcode/biometric ID, remote control app, and antivirus/firewall  
4 
All participants involved in experiments must agree to the following: 
• All smartphone data generated during the experiments are subject to monitor and 
analysis 
• All participants are allowed to take photos but forbidden to extract/upload any file 
or content generated during the experiment to external/cloud storage or social 
media. File transfer between participants is allowed. 
• Participants are liable for any smartphone-related misconduct that is not associated 
with experiments 
2. Experiments and Scenarios 
We developed three scenarios to represent the most likely and current smartphone 
applications in the Taiwan navy. The duration of the experiment is our baseline for 
scenario development. First, the long-term experiment is based on an ashore scenario and 
lasts one month. Second, the short-term experiment is based on a maritime scenario and 
lasts one week. Last, the rushed experiment is based on an emergency scenario and lasts 
for only one day. Each experiment is comprised of four parts: scenario description, 
participant list, experimental objective, and deliverable data.  
a. Long-Term (Ashore Scenario—One Month) 
Since the Taiwan naval force is not currently engaged in any conflict and spends 
more time ashore, we created a long-term experiment that aims to simulate the Taiwan 
navy’s daily operations and activities ashore, such as situation reports (SITREPs), general 
administrative tasks, training coordination, and unclassified communications. Table 16 
describes the long-term experiment in detail. 
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PFG-1202 has been selected as the pilot unit to conduct the Taiwan 
navy smartphone incorporation pilot program for 30 days. The ship is 
expected to stay in port and to keep up all routine tasks such as training 
and maintenance for the duration of the program. In addition, crew on 
leave forms several safety groups during the leave period, and the 
group leaders are to conduct safety checks and report results back to 
the ship no later than 1900 every day. The officer of the deck (OOD) is 
to deliver routine ship’s SITREP that includes crew muster count, 
fuel/water/ammunition stock, and plan of the day (POD) at 2000 every 
day. Synopsis: the crew carries out usual work and personal tasks 




PFG-1202 crew and ship’s phones 
124th Flotilla quarter deck and operation/training office phones 
Experimental 
Objectives 
Show smartphone impact on productivity and costs associated with 
daily ashore activities in the Taiwan navy 
Show the potential realistic security risk of the smartphone 
incorporation in the Taiwan navy 
Deliverable 
Data 
Participants’ smartphone bill during the experiment 
Participants’ smartphone media data (audio, photo, and video files) 
generated during the experiment 
Participant feedback during the experiment  
 
b. Short-Term (Maritime Scenario—One Week) 
The short-term experiment aims to simulate the Taiwan navy’s routine maritime 
operations and activities. In addition, the experiment also demonstrates commercial 
SATCOM capabilities using BGAN terminals. Table 17 describes the short-term 
experiment in detail. 
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PFG-1202 is currently underway for a one-week long patrolling 
mission. On the third day of the mission, the ship encounters a 
suspicious vessel, and the CO decides to conduct aerial 
reconnaissance. The helicopter pilot takes photos of the suspect target 
and uses BGAN to transfer the images back to 124th Flotilla 
operations office for target verification after returning to the ship. On 
the fourth day, the CO grants BGAN access to the crew who want to 
contact their families and loved ones. Synopsis: the ship conducts a 
regular maritime mission while using the smartphone and commercial 
SATCOM capabilities whenever and wherever the CO sees fit. 
Participant 
List 
PFG-1202 crew and ship’s phones 
124th Flotilla quarter deck and operation/training office phones 
Experimental 
Objective 
Demonstrate the smartphone and commercial SATCOM capabilities in 
a maritime environment to the Taiwan navy 
Show smartphone and commercial SATCOM impact on crew morale 
Deliverable 
Data 
BGAN terminal usage and fee 
Participants’ smartphone media data (audio, photo, and video files) 
generated during the experiment 
Participant feedback during the experiment 
 
c. Rushed (Emergency Scenario—One Day) 
The rushed experiment aims to simulate possible emergencies in the Taiwan navy. 
The scenario aims to cover both maritime and ashore conditions and to show the 
enhanced mobility potential of smartphone incorporation and commercial SATCOM 
application in the Taiwan navy. Table 18 describes the rushed experiment in detail. 
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On the last day of the patrolling mission, PFG-1202 receives a distress 
call from a foreign sailboat that suffered engine failure and requires 
rescue. Under the CO’s order, the ship rushes to the site and 
successfully rescues three people onboard. There is only one problem: 
they only speak Portuguese. With the assistance of smartphones and 
BGAN, the crew is able to communicate with the rescued personnel 
and to document the entire emergency with videos and photos. Upon 
returning to port, 124th Flotilla operation office prepares the necessary 
medications for the rescued personnel who also use the crew’s 
smartphones to contact families and loved ones. Synopsis: the ship 
conducts an emergency rescue mission while using smartphones and 




PFG-1202 crew and ship’s phones 
124th Flotilla quarter deck and operation/training office phones 
Experimental 
Objective 
Demonstrate smartphone and commercial SATCOM capabilities in an 
unpredictable emergency situation for the Taiwan navy 
Show smartphone and commercial SATCOM impact on the Taiwan 
navy’s emergency response capability 
Deliverable 
Data 
BGAN terminal usage and fee 
Participants’ smartphone media data (audio, photo, and video files) 
generated during the experiment 
Participants’ feedback during the experiment 
 
C. PRODUCT 
The experimental data serve as the quantitative measures to provide the Taiwan 
navy with initial insights and assessments of smartphone incorporation. The intent of the 
pilot program is to deliver three main sets of data: operation costs, device content, and 
participant feedback. First, the operation costs provides the Taiwan navy quantitative 
measures of smartphone impact on communications cost. Second, the device content, 
such as media files, text message/call/data usage, and application downloads, helps the 
Taiwan navy understand the delicate relationship of security and productivity induced by 
smartphone incorporation. Lastly, participant feedback provides valuable employee 
opinions regarding smartphone incorporation within the Taiwan navy and helps it 
develop a successful smartphone incorporation policy.  
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1. Data Analysis and Comparison 
To better understand smartphone influence on security, productivity, cost, and 
user experience, we summarize necessary data analyses and comparisons in Table 19 to 
show the underlying results and implications from the experiments.  
Table 19.   Data Analysis and Comparison 
Influence Data Analysis Comparison 
Cost Participant’s smartphone bill 
Cost analysis of text 
message, call, and 
data usage during the 
experiment to show 
the smartphone’s 
impact on ashore 
communication 
expenses 
Compare cost during 
the experiment 
against other regular 
monthly bills 
Cost BGAN terminal usage and fee 
Cost analysis of 
BGAN usage to show 
the commercial 
SATCOM cost in 
maritime operation 
Compare BGAN cost 
against estimated 
operations cost of 
same usage using 
military SATCOM 
Security Device contents 
Analyze device 
content to determine 
the presence of 
content that poses 
threat to information 
and operation security 
Identify areas where 
security was either 














completion time of 
the same 
communication and 






Analyze activity logs 
to determine 
applications usage 
and user behavior 
Identify areas where 
productivity was 
either enhanced or 
adversely impacted 
User experience Participant feedback 
Analyze participant 
feedback to determine 
the percentage of 
positive and negative 
experiences 
Identify experiences 
that would have been 





2. Evaluation Criteria and Standards 
Evaluation criteria and standards serve as benchmarks to the smartphone 
influence to be explored by the pilot program and as a basis for guidelines to the Taiwan 
navy to facilitate smartphone incorporation. Based on the categories of influence or 
impact in the data analysis and comparison, the evaluation metrics are presented in Table 
20 according to the same categories as the analysis and comparison, in a relatively simple 
and straightforward manner.  
Table 20.   Evaluation Metrics 
 
Category 










same tasks  
No device 
content should 












be more than 
51% 
 
The pilot program is intended to provide the Taiwan navy with data so as to 
assess whether or not smartphone incorporation poses unacceptable threats to information 
and operations security; its potential impact to productivity and morale; and its cost to the 
organization. The valuable measurements, assessments, and insights from the pilot 
program are necessary supports to a successful development of an effective smartphone 
incorporation plan that ultimately optimizes the security and productivity needed by the 
Taiwan navy. 
 76 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An invincible military unit is the perfect integration of security and productivity. 
This is the vision that all military organizations, including the Taiwan navy, have. In the 
Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote, “Those skilled in warfare establish positions that make them 
invincible.” 152  To become an invincible force the Taiwan navy needs to modify its 
approach towards smartphone technology. Instead of denying and blockading it, the 
Taiwan navy should leverage and incorporate it. This research has shown that with the 
right combination of hardware and software, the smartphone can be secure and 
productive, and help the Taiwan navy become so. We understand that the Taiwan navy is 
willing to safeguard its information security at all cost. However, through research and 
analysis, we show the Taiwan navy that safeguarding information security does not 
necessarily mean sacrificing information productivity and connectivity. The focus on 
mobile security has prompted the development of various security technologies and 
concepts such as hardware roots of trust, application “sandboxing,” and application 
review. These technologies spread across the five layers of the mobile security stack to 
establish a safe environment where everyone, including the Taiwan navy, can trust the 
smartphone to empower us by bringing productivity and connectivity to our fingertips, 
while remaining vigilant to the risks associated with all networked communications.  
A. SUMMARY 
The assurance of information security and operation security when incorporating 
smartphones into the Taiwan navy force structure is dependent on the constant 
improvement of the entire smartphone incorporation process, strategy, policy, 
technology, and training. Our research focuses on the technology piece in the process and 
identifies the most appropriate COTS system in the market. The advantages of the COTS 
approach include faster procurement and deployment, lower cost, and less technical and 
financial risk compared to the custom-developed approach. Another reason we favored 
152 Thomas Huynh, The Art of War—Spirituality for Conflict: Annotated & Explained (Woodstock, 
VT: SkyLight Paths, 2008), 51. 
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the COTS approach was due to the fact that most COTS systems have been designed for 
the consumer market and have a high rating of usability. 
The Apple iOS system is the most suitable choice to start the incorporation 
process. Its security-oriented designs including hardware, operating system, software, and 
ecosystem show promise for maintaining smartphone security while supporting 
productivity natively. One important deficiency that the Apple iOS, and all other 
smartphones, has is the lack of a location-based security service. This capability is 
considered critical due to its potential to seamlessly manage security and productivity. 
The location-based security allows intuitive and finer-grained smartphone security 
implementation, while maximizing productivity by using the smartphone’s physical 
location instead of a user’s free will to distinguish work and personal space.  
A smartphone operating without connectivity is akin to a Tesla electric car 
traveling without a rechargeable battery: both systems are ineffective. SATCOM proves 
to be the answer to bring connectivity to remote maritime environments and to enable 
smartphones to supplement the Taiwan navy maritime C2 capabilities. Smartphones can 
do so by staying connected to the Internet via SATCOM to project its capabilities 
towards routine and unforeseen operations at sea through various smartphone IP-based 
applications. In addition, the Taiwan navy can consider commercial SATCOM, whose 
operating cost continues to improve, as a feasible backup to its regular C2 infrastructure 
resources.  
In the Taiwan navy, the perception of risks and benefits of smartphone 
incorporation varies dramatically between the two stakeholder groups. One group’s 
benefits can often be the other’s risks, and vice versa. For example, an adoptive 
stakeholder welcomes the productivity brought on by smartphone incorporation, but the 
perceived benefit can be viewed as a critical security risk by the top leadership in the 
organization. In contrast, the top leadership’s determination to ensure total information 
security can become a costly barrier that restricts adoption of the smartphone’s 
capabilities with respect to productivity, competitiveness, and initiative by the adoptive 
stakeholder in the information warfare age.  
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In the grand scheme of incorporating smartphones into the Taiwan navy force 
structure, a pilot program is necessary to explore the risks and assess benefits assumed by 
both stakeholder groups and evaluate the performance of the recommended technologies. 
The pilot program constructed in this study consists of three experiments that simulate 
common ashore activities, common at sea activities, and emergencies. Through these 
experiments, we propose the collection of various pieces of data such as device content, 
activity logs, spending records, and user feedback to reveal the influence and impact that 
smartphones and commercial SATCOM have on security, productivity, cost, and user 
experience. Ultimately, the purpose of the pilot program is to use its analytical results to 
help address adoption concerns and determine the possibility of smartphone incorporation 
in the Taiwan navy. 
This research has spent a great deal of time and effort to assemble the existing 
COTS smartphone security-related technologies in order to provide the Taiwan navy with 
secure technological options. To develop an incorporation plan that ensures both 
information security and operation security, the recommended option alone is a 
convincible starting point but not a magic wand that will conjure up a fail-proof plan. 
Only when all aspects of the incorporation process, namely strategy, policy, technology, 
and training, fit with one another can we confidently trust that smartphone technology 
will bring a balance of security and productivity to the Taiwan navy. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Finding the right technological solutions for the Taiwan navy to build a proper 
smartphone approach that optimizes information security and productivity was the goal 
of this research. The increasingly disproportional and damaging negativity of the Taiwan 
local news and social media against the Taiwan military only stresses the need to further 
this research. There are several possible reasons for the information security incidents 
that have resulted from the use of smartphones. Some may in part be due to mismatch 
within the smartphone incorporation process or in part due to an inappropriate approach 
to smartphone security management. The purpose of this research was to assist the 
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Taiwan navy to further recognize and understand the importance of smartphones with 
respect to the maneuverability and their capability to enhance information age operations.  
Currently, the Taiwan Ministry of Defense continues to address information 
security risks by instituting stricter regulations and heavier punishments that further 
impair its productivity and undermine the possibility of recapturing the initiative in the 
local information domain. To limit the Taiwan navy from entering a vicious cycle of 
trying to fully eliminate the security risk posed by smartphones, the Taiwan navy must 
leverage the existence of abundant efficient and effective smartphone device and 
application management tools to find the balance between security and productivity. 
Significantly, we discovered that the location-based security service, which is absent 
from all of the major smartphone operating systems, can be the critical missing piece for 
the Taiwan navy to establish a comprehensive environment where security is upheld, 
productivity thrives, and the user is satisfied. To advance the finding from this thesis, the 
mobile device incorporation process customization and location-based security 
application are the identified areas for further study. 
While the Apple iOS and BlackBerry show strong performance in upholding 
smartphone security, the other smartphone systems can improve and strengthen their 
security performance with help from third-party applications, whose trending cross-
platform and cloud-based movement may provide the Taiwan navy more flexible and 
suitable technological solutions in the near future. “Mobility first and stay connected” is a 
global phenomenon that the Taiwan navy cannot and should not resist. It requires the 
Taiwan navy to rethink its strategy, revise its policy, review its technology, and reinvent 
its training to construct a sound plan for smartphone incorporation. As the smartphone 
continues to revolutionize and deepen its roots in every aspect of day-to-day life, trying 
to isolate the Taiwan troops from it seems strikingly and alarmingly similar to the closed-
door policy of the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century. In order to prevent history 
from repeating itself, it is time for the Taiwan navy to attempt different approaches to 
explore the best practice of productive mobile security to chart the endless possibilities in 
the sea of information and to navigate its strategy towards the leading edge of 
information mobility. 
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